Using today's U.S. Army Forces to achieve real transformation
01/10/2004


"In 1941, it was not obvious to American military leaders what the impact on land warfare of new technology would be. In retrospect, a couple of observations from World War II seem relevant to force design and technology in the current war. First, the U.S. Armed Forces were much more successful integrating the arms readily available within their own services than in coordinating the use of weapons employed by other services. In other words, in most operations there was little or no 'jointness'.

Second, U.S. Army ground forces proved to be more skilled and tenacious in defensive operations than in offensive operations against the German Army. There were several reasons for this. American offensive combat power - armored forces - were extremely vulnerable to German shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons like the Panzerfaust - a forerunner of the Russian rocket-propelled grenade - as well as anti-tank guns and mines.

Though thoroughly mechanized by 1944, the mobility of U.S. forces could not compensate for the vulnerability of thin, ineffective armor protection because American tanks and tank destroyers lacked gyro-stabilized tank-killing guns and could not fire accurately on-the-move and kill enemy tanks from any angle. The length of training for masses of Citizen-Soldiers that preceded assignment to operational units was short and unit cohesiveness was poor. As a result of all these factors, attacks on the ground only succeeded when American numerical superiority was assured and artillery fire could be delivered in massive volumes.

One comes away from this discussion with a sense that the need for effective, joint integrative command and control on the operational and tactical levels of war is as acute as ever. With the growing lethality of modern weapons, superior technology in terms of devastating firepower, armor protection and mobility is just as important today. And the unit cohesion that springs from genuine training readiness and confidence in the chain-of-command is an unchanging requirement. So, it is a safe bet that developments in these three dynamic areas should profoundly influence the Army's current transformation".

--U.S. Army Armor Colonel

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Table of Contents

PPT Slide 1 Outline

PPT Slide 2 Maneuver & Strike

PPT Slide 3 Briefing's Goals

PPT Slide 4 City Fighting

PPT Slide 5 Afghan Lessons

PPT Slide 6 Unifying Concepts

PPT Slide 7 Unclear Targets

PPT Slide 8 IDF M113s/tanks

PPT Slide 9 Future Options

PPT Slide 10 Joint Packages

PPT Slide 11 Joint Commands

PPT Slide 12 Command/Control

PPT Slide 13 Less bureaucracy

PPT Slide 14 Targeting

PPT Slide 15 Adaptability

PPT Slide 16 ABN-ASSLT Group

PPT Slide 17 Aviation Group

PPT Slide 18 LRSG Armor

PPT Slide 19 Strike Weapons

PPT Slide 20 Integral C2

PPT Slide 21 Aviation TF

PPT Slide 22 LRSG

PPT Slide 23 Armed Recon

PPT Slide 24 Air/Grnd Systems

PPT Slide 25 LRSG fixes MEU

PPT Slide 26 Sustainment Grp

PPT Slide 27 C4I Group

PPT Slide 28 African Scenario

PPT Slide 29 War timeline

PPT Slide 30 Friendly SSMC

PPT Slide 31 Ready Cycles

PPT Slide 32 Key points

PPT Slide 33 Conclusion

Author: James Gavin Jr.

Email: itsg@hotmail.com

Home Page: www.reocities.com/equipmentshop

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