Dominant Logistics

The Future of Deployment and Sustainment

By Scott Miller
Last Updated - 1/08/04

About the Project                Supporting Articles

Vol. I:  An Introduction to Dominant Logistics
Vol. II:  PRE-Transformation - A Department of Logistics
Vol. III:  PRE-Transformation - Giving Joint Vision Some Glasses
Vol. IV: Understanding and Developing Active Capacity
Vol. V:  Reorganizing Defense
Vol. VI:  Project FutureThink - Tapping the Technological Cycle
Vol. VII: Transforming Military Spending

Vol. VIII: National Strategy

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has lacked anything remotely resembling a clear national strategy with regards to defense issues.  If we are to transform the military, it is necessary to define the needs and missions for which this transformation is required.  Strikingly, there has been little debate of this topic, even in military circles and this has resulted in many problems, not the least of which is an array of seemingly endless taskings for which our national interests are unclear.  We cannot continue the practice of spending $400 billion per year on defense without at least paying lip service to the question of "Why?"

Too often, it seems as though this question is not just left unanswered but used as an excuse.  Instead of honestly assessing our military and strategic postures, the DOD seems to take this question and immediately jump to a stance of attempting to justify the size of our current military.  We get scenarios of Two Major Theaters of War without anyone ever bothering to address what exactly that even means to the security of the United States.  What about potential attacks on the United States itself?  What about the growing threat of ballistic missiles?   Where does terrorism lie within this equation?  And what exactly are we getting for our $400 billion plus per year?

Security Threats

A common misconception in America today is that the greatest threat to our nation comes from terrorists.  While they do tend to get the headlines, the reality is that terrorism poses no real threat on a national level.  This is not to say that terrorism should be ignored - it is, after all, the purpose of the military to defend the nation against ALL threats.  But there are more pressing concerns that must be addressed in addition to terrorism

#1 - Former Soviet Nuclear Arsenal

Without a doubt, the gravest threat posed to this nation is the remaining nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union.  The record for terrorist death tolls was established on 9/11 when approximately 3000 Americans were killed, two major buildings destroyed, another damaged, and misc. other problems caused.  There are Soviet-era warheads with one megaton in yield - a single one of these warheads, detonated in the same location as the WTC would literally erase most of New York City from the map.   Even smaller warheads are far more devastating than those used against Japan in World War II and these are available in very large quantities.  Whether by hijacking one of Russia's mobile missile launchers or stealiing a warhead in storage, these warheads pose the greatest threat to our national existence.  Similar high-yield warheads exist in other national inventories including China, France, and England.  Even an accidental launch (which is not impossible at all) could devastate the United States.

There is no legitimate reason for the continued possession of the massive nuclear arsenals that remain from the Cold War.  Our relations with Russia have improved dramatically, enabling significant reductions.  It is in this nation's best interests to see these reductions come about if for no other reason than to eliminate the chance that some future, less friendly Russian government would have access to them.   No other nation in the world has anything near the nuclear arsenals possessed by Russia and the United States.  With our ongoing efforts to develop missile defense capabilities, it is clearly time for massive reductions in the arsenals.

As a step towards the ultimate abandonment of nuclear weapons (at an appropriate future time), our arsenal should be reduced to a limited number of submarine-launched missiles on a reduced fleet of submarines.  An effective arsenal with our current capabilities requires no more than nine total missile submarines (one in reserve for refueling rotations), each carrying 16 missiles with a reduced load of five warheads per missile.  Including some spares, this would give us a total of about 1000 of our best nuclear warheads (plus plenty of capacity for decoys or other systems) with 320 warheads at sea and ready to fire at any given time, another 320 in a ready reserve status and available if tensions increase, and another 80 loaded and available with notice. 

Russia has already openly expressed a desire to reduce their arsenal to a similar level so we wouldn't see any argument from them as they cannot afford to maintain the arsenal they currently hold.  The SLBMs are the most potent and survivable of the missiles in our arsenal so this is hardly a token force - aside from Russia, this remains substantially larger than any other nuclear arsenal.   Land-based missile forces can be retired and the land made available for other, more useful purposes and the Air Force can focus its efforts on missile defense instead of maintaining an arsenal we no longer need.

#2 - Decaying Infrastructure

The problem with decaying national infrastructure is that whenever a normal failure in a major system (like the power grid) occurs, it is impossible to determine whether this was a normal failure or a terrorist act.  Resources and money must then be committed to investigating every minor burp in what are problematic systems.   Every resource committed to investigating accidents is a resource that is not engaged in legitimate national defense purposes.

Recent studies have indicated a need for over $1.6 trillion in improvements to our national infrastucture.  Already, serious accidents including blackouts, dam failures, and pipeline accidents are becoming almost commonplace.   American citizens are dying from our failure to adequately address the needs of physically sustaining the nation.  In years gone by, these types of issues were the responsibility of the Army Corps of Engineers - where are they now?

DOD funding is already used to provide services such as the Coast Guard and Federal Emergency Management Agency so it is not as though defense dollars are not already being spent on civil defense projects.  Years ago, much of the defense budget was specifically for civil defense.  At a minimum, approximately $50 billion of the annual defense budget needs to be devoted to rebuilding our national infrastructure (in addition to existing infrastructure funding).  As far gone as much of our infrastructure is, a national bond program, not unlike the old War Bonds, may be an appropriate option for additional funding to expedite our rebuilding efforts.  This is especially important today as our population is undergoing an aging cycle where in another decade or two, we will not have the personnel resources to undertake this effort as there won't be enough young people available for these physically intensive jobs (The Baby Boomers are hitting retirement and aborted too many of their kids).   Realistically, it is going to take between 20 and 30 years just to get our infrastructure back into a manageable state.

Given the quantities of excess land currently controlled by the Department of Defense, some of this land should be sold off or made available to commercial uses in order to finance efforts to rebuild the nation's infrastructure.   For example, excess bases can be used for power generation facilities while the rent for this land is used to assist in repairing the nation's power grids.  Rail and bridge infrastructure should also be targeted for improvement.  While some will claim this isn't the DOD's responsibility, this is nonsense.  Any deploying mechanized or armor unit is transported by rail or truck to a seaport for loading on ships - if the bridges and rails cannot continue to support the equipment we are transporting, how will the Army continue to be able to deploy?  A similar argument can be made regarding air traffic control, the other primary means of transporting military men and materials.   Seaports are another critical area in need of investment.  If we continue to ignore this growing problem, we will soon come to the day our military will become fully distracted or even crippled by infrastructure related problems. 

Worse yet, these issues are weaknesses within the overall defense of the nation.  Weak bridges can easily be destroyed to prevent our deploying of troops.   Air traffic control problems can cripple our aerial deployment capabilities.   Seaports can be blocked as well.  Electric and communication problems can cause massive disruptions in defense capabilities.  Infrastructure matters - we ignore it at our peril.

#3 - Terrorism

Coming in at a relatively distant third is the phenomenon of terrorism.  This is a serious problem but it is also one that is best addressed honestly and openly without all the hype and hysteria that typically encompasses this topic.  Terrorists are dangerous and pose a threat to the people of this nation - this cannot be denied, nor should it be.  That having been said, the threat of terrorism is much more psychological than physical.

The entire point of terrorism is to scare the crap out of people in an effort to achieve some goal that cannot be achieved by other means.  Terrorism is not unlike the spoiled child who cannot get his own way and insists on throwing a fit   - with explosives.  Even the reasoning used by some to justify the act (that murdering others for not sharing ones beliefs allows one to spend eternity having sex with virgins) is a psychological product one would expect to find in a hormone ravaged adolescent.   No matter how tragic this reality is, at the end of the day, there are people out there who believe it is their purpose in life to kill us.  These are not people who are reasonable, rational, or even necessarily sane.  The notion that these people can be dealt with in a controlled, adult fashion is pure fantasy - it is their goal to die in the process of killing us.  Our best hope for dealing with these terrorists is quite simple - ensure successful completion of the former while preventing the latter.

To that end, we need to take a variety of steps.  I think the current administration, contrary to popular beliefs, is already taking some of the right steps by attempting to engage the terrorists abroad.  As someone once said, perhaps it would make sense to attempt to out-terror the terrorist by hitting them first.   This is also a means by which the terrorists will become drawn out into the open where they are much easier to kill.  But we also should be taking REAL steps here at home to minimize the impact they can have.  A number of articles I've previously written offer some suggestions:

A Blueprint for Homeland Defense
Why TIA Will Never Work and Alternatives That Will
Cyberwar Solutions
Betting on Terror
The C-17 for Homeland Defense

Another key issue to address is our porous borders.  An interesting suggestion from Carlton Meyer is to use dogs at the borders in pens to guard problematic areas.  Some have suggested constructing a physical barrier or using UAVs to patrol the borders as well.  All of these are excellent suggestions and should receive serious consideration.  An idea I once considered was to enlarge and extend the existing waterway and actually construct a canal between the U.S. and Mexico.   With all the old explosives the DOD has to blow up each year, one would think there would be enough to get much of the work done right there.  This would be arguably the largest engineering project in the history of mankind but the gains would be impressive in a variety of areas, not the least of which would be security of our southern border.

#4 - Major Regional Conflict

Current doctrine is based upon the bogus concept of fighting two major regional wars in near simultaneous fashion.  For all practical purposes, this scenario is impossible.  This concept was developed not as a legitimate strategic possibility but as a means by which to justify retaining an excessively large military force.  Conceptually, every "two major regional" war in history has been a world war - not an impossible future scenario, but not a particularly likely one either.   We SHOULD be prepared to fight another world war as we should be prepared for ANY potential scenario but this doesn't mean that our entire force should be developed around this relatively limited threat.

A single theater event, on the other hand, is not only likely, it is quite common historically speaking.  Consequently, we should place considerable emphasis on our ability to engage in major theater conflicts.  While there are those who would follow that comment with a list of nations who we could end up in war with, I prefer to take the common sense and far more accurate approach.  There is no nation out there today that we are likely to enter into a major theater war - most nations saw what's happened in Afghanistan and Iraq and they aren't too anxious to pick a fight with us.

That having been said, in the 1930s, before the advent of many modern technologies, the Third Reich went from a bad joke to arguably the most powerful military in the planet in a total span of less than 10 years.  This was achieved:

  1. During the Great Depression which devastated German industry
  2. While Germany was under heavy sanctions and restrictions from WWI
  3. During a time when most nations would not support Germany, most directly opposed it
  4. Before the advent of the computer, satellites, the Internet, and other modern technologies
  5. Before the integrated circuit made electrical devices reliable
  6. Before much of the chemicals and composites of modern society existed
  7. Before nuclear weapons
  8. While wasting much of his resources and energy on internal conflicts (fighting communists and such)
  9. While wasting more of his resources on genocide against the Jews consistent with Mein Kampf
  10. While the entire world watched the whole thing, knowing what was happening, and doing nothing

Hitler took power in 1933 - by the end of 1939, the Blitzkrieg was well underway.  Realistically, Germany went from nowhere to most powerful in the world in a span of less than seven years.  In the modern era, all it takes is a lone psycho forcing his way into power to generate a major regional conflict with global implications.  Consider Saddam Hussein with his invasions of Iran and Kuwait, Bin Laden with his fighting on a global scale, and the never-ending conflicts involving Israel as just a few examples of major regional warfare.  Similar conflicts have gone down in the former Yugoslavia, internally in Russia, and throughout the African continent.

Fourth generation warfare does pose a definitive threat to the United States over the long term.  However, there is no indication whatsoever that conventional warfare is going away any time soon.  Contrary to popular belief, ballistic and anti-aircraft missiles are suprisingly cheap when compared to fielding a modern Air Force.  Sea mines and anti-ship missiles can counter virtually anything that currently exists in the U.S. Navy.  Land mines are still a very potent threat against any conventional land force.  Anti-satellite weaponry is also suprisingly cheap and effective.  As much as we currently spend on our military, the entire force can be effectively countered by conventional means for a fraction of what we spend annually.  A very potent military can be assembled and used at less than $10 billion per year.  And this doesn't even factor in nuclear weapons.

Relations Between the Economy and Defense

Many in the defense reform community often refer to certain military procurement programs as "jobs programs" and this is a fairly accurate description.  But it is also one that must be understood as our leaders today are devastating segments of our economy in a bizarre effort to "save infrastucture."   Somehow, efforts that are in fact destroying our defense infrastructure are deemed to be saving it.  The following is an explanation of how this relationship must be repaired.

The posterchild of this phenomenon is current problems in the steel and shipbuilding industries that are being caused by efforts to "save" our submarine and other ship production infrastructures.  Naive politicians have adopted the belief that defense dollars somehow are equivalent to defense jobs - that if we spend more money on procurement, we can stop the massive decline in industrial production in this country.   Nothing could be further from the truth.

The definitive measure of defense production is not dollars but quantities of goods being produced.  Cheaper products, produced in quantity, will create far more jobs than smaller quantities of expensive goods.  The total end prices remain roughly the same but the benefit to the economy overall is greater for the quantity option than for the quality option.  A larger quantity of systems means that more materials are required for production, more parts are required for service and maintenance, more tools are required for production and maintenance, etc, etc.  This is the fundamental basis of trickle down economics - money spent at the top trickles down in a variety of paths throughout the entire economy, with greater quantities of goods spreading the same amount of money across a greater variety of paths.

In the mid to late 1990s, shipbuilding in the United States came to a virtual halt.  Only a fraction of our previous shipbuilding capacity remains today with less than a handful of combat ships being produced compared to more than three times that in years gone by.  This inevitably trickled down to where machine tooling companies, that make the machines to build the parts, have also largely disappeared in the United States, there is only one or two left.  The steel industry, that provides the raw materials not just for the ships and their parts but also for the tools themselves, has also collapsed as demand for the product worldwide has declined while production capacity is far more than demand.

Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, between 3 and five nuclear attack submarines were commissioned every year, while roughly one Ohio-class joined the fleet annually as well.  Twenty seven Tico cruisers were built during this same timeframe.  Twenty six Burke-class destroyers were ordered from 1985 to 1993.   Four Nimitz carriers were built as well as all seven of the existing LHD carriers.   By comparison, the typical current year will see 3 destroyers enter the fleet, with occasionally a single submarine or carrier entering the fleet as well.  The fact that we are still spending billions in ship procurement is immaterial - we're building fewer than five combat ships in the typical year compared to a previous sustained production rate of 10-12 ships in a given year.  This means fewer materials, fewer tools, and fewer jobs no matter how you look at it. 

This trend is by no means limited to the Navy.  The realities of the Air Force infrastructure have become downright scary.  When the LightWeight Fighter competition opened back in the early 1970s, eight contractors were competing for the right to produce what would become the F-16.  By the time we reached the Joint Strike Fighter competition, that number was down to two or three.  Today, only two remain but in all likelihood, Boeing will be out of the fighter production business in the near future.  What is scary is that none of the remaining players in the aviation business were companies that won the big aviation production contracts of the late 60s and early 70s - only the losers remain standing today.  General Dynamics won the F-16 and F-111 contracts and today is out of the business entirely.  Northrup won the Navy's F-18 deal which ended up being sold off to Boeing while the company headed in a different direction.  Boeing also acquired Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas aviation entities, all of which had won recent production contracts.  Of the original aviation contractors available to the DOD, the only two that currently remain standing are the only ones that hadn't won a major aviation contract since the 1950s.  Every recent production contract winner bit the dust - and the reason why couldn't be more plain.

From the period of 1982 to 1988, Rockwell produced 100 B-1B heavy bombers but no major work followed this run.  Grumman production of the F-14 ceased in 1990 with no further funding available while it's other major contracts, the A-6 Intruder and B-2 Spirit (as Northrup Grumman) met a similar demise.  McDonnell Douglas had the F-15 as its major bread winner but the Eagle's replacement was contracted out to Lockheed in 1991 so this program hit a wall as well.  General Dynamics met a similar fate with the F-16.   Neither Lockheed Martin nor Boeing had won a major military aviation production deal in decades and yet by the late 1990s, they were the last companies remaining in the entire industry.  After 50-plus years of purchasing hundreds and in some cases thousands of aircraft per year, the industry crashed to mere dozens of military aircraft procured per year.  And again, this translates into further reductions in orders for parts, raw materials, and tooling.  Similar experiences have occured in production of tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters, and other military hardware.

The Pentagon's obsession with high dollar, top-of-the-line hardware must be brought under control if we are to retain the means to provide for our own defense.  Technology can provide a significant advantage to the military but this must be achieved with a sustainable balance of lower cost, lesser systems that are produced in quantities that can sustain the defense infrastructure.  Low cost systems are also more exportable as they pose less of a threat to our own forces while being more cost effective for our allies.  Conventional powered submarines are desired by most of our allies and yet not a single design is available from a U.S. manufacturer.  Few nations aside from the United States and Russia can justify the expense of naval ships larger than destroyers and yet the destroyer is the smallest combat ship currently employed by the U.S. Navy.  The F-22 and JSF have both priced themselves out of international competition for all practical purposes as no nation aside from the U.S. can even dream of purchasing either of these aircraft in any significant quantity.  Tanks and ground vehicles?  Forget it, we haven't had affordable, exportable products for years (aside from our excess older hardware) even though this used to be one of our strongest areas.

A prudent approach would be to adopt something resembling the Air Force's high-low concept for all procurement of combat systems.  Develop a high-end system that will push the technological envelope while a low-end system is developed and produced concurrently for enhanced quantities of systems and for export purposes.   This program would involve three steps:

  1. The funding for a given generic concept would be divided in half with equal amounts of money available to the high-end and low-end programs.  Initial funding is to support research and development of the high-end while developing the infrastructure needs of the low-end.  Each "end" gets a relatively equal amount of funding and this funding should be fixed.
  2. The high-end system will push the envelope of technology and should be driven by the concept of how many systems can be procured for the funding available with the highest performance achievable.
  3. The low-end system is for production sustainment and combat reinforcements while being determined by the question of how much performance can we purchase for the available funding while producing "x" number of units per year.

With this approach, we can set production targets that are necessary to sustain the defense production infrastructure.  Contractors should be required to share production of low-end systems to spread the quantities being produced throughout the defense base as these will not involve major technology anyways.  The program would work something like this:

The DOD defines a need for a new submarine program but this doesn't necessarily mean building all new submarines either - they set a technological capability they wish to achieve, the budget to reach those goals is fixed and they can get there however the industry can reach the goal without going over budget.  This defines the high-end of the program as well as our total program budget..

A study of the submarine production infrastructure determines that to maintain a total force size of the desired 72 attack submarines, we need to produce an average of about 2.5 submarines per year because the subs last for 30 years.  So for our low-end, we'll set our desired production rate at 2 submarines per year for a low-end system.

Program funds are then divided evenly between the high and low programs.  Let's say that we want to set the limit at a total of $80 billion for the attack submarine procurement.  The Pentagon then gets $40 billion for their dream subs, with the quantity procured left open so we can achieve whatever technological goals we set.  This may involve building new subs, rebuilding older subs, or a combination thereof but the total amount to be spent has a fixed cap of $40 billion total.  With the remaining $40 billion, the question is posed to industry, "We have $40 billion to purchase 60 submarines over a 30-year span, what's the best you can give us while this price tag is fixed?" and let the chips fall where they may.  If this means going conventional or even importing a design to be produced locally, so be it. 

What we end up with is a fleet of substantial size where a healthy portion will remain the best in the world while the rest remains affordable and exportable.  We retain the cutting edge technological advantage while also retaining the size and scope necessary for major operations.  But most importantly, this will allow us to sustain our defense infrastructure so we can continue to meet our defense needs without severely disrupting the nation's economy as is happening today due to the lack of defense procurement in the 1990s.

Alliances and Treaties

One of the more curious aspects of American foreign policy is our tendency to partner ourselves with those nations from whom we can benefit in no way while ignoring those nations from which we CAN benefit.  Contintental Europe has virtually nothing beneficial to the United States - aside from a limited selection of items, our relationship with continental European nations has no rational basis.  And yet we cling to our European relations as though they are the most valuable in the world.   They often pick trade wars with us, they routinely go against us in international affairs, and they leech off of our military and yet we not only accept it, we openly encourage it.

The Middle East is another curious aspect of our foreign policy.   I can understand our relations with Israel and during the Cold War a partnership with Turkey made sense as well.  But what about Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and Egypt?  Everyone likes pointing to the oil in the ground but that can be done cheaper and with far fewer headaches here at home, in Canada, and in Venezuela - most Middle East oil goes to Europe and the Far East, not the United States.  In the current climate, Russia is also a better option for oil imports than the Middle East.  Suffice it to say that the time is appropriate to reevaluate our foreign relations and develop some new partnerships that are based upon mutual benefits and not Cold War defense priorities.

Our foreign partnerships should be categorized into four distinct types of arrangement based upon the nature of the relationship.  Our transactions within each type can then be addressed in legal terms to ensure that we cease the practice of cutting off our noses to despise our faces.

Strategic Allies

These are nations who share a common national interest with ourselves on a variety of levels.  These nations should be eligible for "free trade" agreements but only when they have established human rights, environment, and political records that are consistent with our own.  Our primary area of interest here should be all of the Americas and immediately outlying island regions.

Defense Partners

Defense partners are those nations with whom we partner on a military basis but this is really the extent of the relationship and it should be a bidirectional relationship - Korea and Japan would be considered Defense partners but Taiwan would not.  Israel would be a defense partner but Egypt and Saudi Arabia would not.  Trade here should not be a primary concern outside of a military context - ie there should be no special trade considerations for Japan or Korea, particularly given their records of susidizing industries to gain advantage in the U.S. marketplace.   The President should be given "fast track" trade authority for defense partners on defense matters.

Resource Partners

Resource partners are those nations with whom we share a common interest on the basis of resources.  Russia, Brazil, and Venezuela are good examples of nations we should be trying to forge resource partnerships with.  These nations have resources we desire while we have the technical and physical resources to assist their efforts in providing those natural resources.  These nations also have needs that we are capable of providing including food, medical, and engineering resources.   The President should have fast track authority in these partnerships and trade relations should be kept relatively free except in those cases where blatant trade infractions are occuring (the ongoing steel trade wars).

Supported Nations

These are nations who receive support from the United States in various fashions including humanitarian and military aid.  In general, these relationships are one way streets where the supported nation gains everything at our expense.  A clearly defined limit to this type of relationship must be established and adhered to.  For example, there is no legitimate reason for the United States to be spending more than $5 billion per year on this type of aid that provides no direct benefit to America.  This amount should be set in law and the administration required to justify every dime of expense involved.  This should include our "dues" to the United Nations as well (realistically, we should depart the UN altogether).   Nobody wants to see the children of other nations starving in the streets or freezing in winter but as the proverb goes - give a man a fish and he'll eat for a day, teach him to fish and he can eat for a lifetime.  Handouts are no solution to the problems of other nations.

Everybody Else

Beyond these categories, no other nations should be entitled to anything from the United States.  If they want to trade with us, that is fine but it must be on our terms.  If that means high tariffs to protect some industries, so be it.  If groups like GATT and the WTO don't like it - oh well, there is no reason we need to be a part of those organizations anyways.

We are not only the largest consumer of goods and services in the world - we are also the largest provider.  There is no reason whatsoever that we must maintain the insane levels of trade imbalance that we currently have - we don't need to be importing all this nonsense that is largely being assembled by slave labor and sweatshops.   That having been said, sweatshop wages are quite good in some countries relative to not working at all.  We need to be reasonable and we need to be realistic.   Should we simply not trade at all with India because labor rates in that nation will never be as high as ours?  That would be silly and counterproductive.  On the other hand, should we be engaged in virtually free trade with China, a nation known to use prison labor for producing goods, with a violently oppressive track record, with a history of missile and nuclear proliferation, that has openly threatened to nuke Los Angeles on more than one occasion?

Similarly, why do we continue to ignore the fact that Canada and most of NATO are doing nothing more than leeching off of our military resources?   People are up in arms over our military aid to Israel and Korea, nations that have been far better partners, but ignore that tens of billions are wasted every year sustaining nations that are getting too fat and happy for their own military good.   Taiwan would love nothing more than to increase their defense spending on American hardware and yet we consider cheap trinkets from mainland China to be of more value to our economy than our shipbuilding and steel industries.

Those nations who truely side with our systems and beliefs should be eligible for free trade.  Those nations who differ from us but are true partners in the global arena should get a true benefit and be handled with fast track authority.   The rest of the world should be told to pound sand or beg because we are sick and tired of their refusals to grow up and act like adults.  We will help those who are willing to put forth the effort and are serious about helping themselves.  The rest need to go and suck on a tailpipe.  Period.

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Supporting Articles :


What is Logistics? - 3/10/03
Understanding Strategic Streams - 3/10/03
Building a Logistics Net - 2/10/03
Training Issues - 2/10/03
A Log Pack System - 2/10/03
A Tactical Pallet System - 4/09/03            
The Fast Rope Delivery System and the One Ton Pallet - 2/10/03
The Future of Prepositioned Stocks - 3/10/03
Small Unit Support Operations - 2/10/03
Putting It All Together - 3/10/03
Keeping the Combustibles Flowing - 3/16/03
Solving the Personnel Problem - 6/18/03
Disposing of Cold War Stockpiles - 7/02/03                    
Nukes in the Modern Era - 7/02/03
Force Sustainment Detachments - 8/07/03
Redefining the Reserves with Warrant Officers - 9/11/03                                 
Vol. I:  An Introduction to Dominant Logistics - 6/10/03
Vol. II: PRE-Transformation - A Department of Logistics - 6/10/03
Vol. III: PRE-Transformation - Giving Joint Vision Some Glasses - 6/18/03
Vol. IV:   Understanding and Developing Active Capacity - 7/02/03
Vol. V:  Reorganizing Defense - 7/28/03
Vol. VI:  Project FutureThink - Tapping the Technological Cycle - 8/07/03
Vol. VII:  Transforming Military Spending - 9/17/03
Vol. VIII:  National Strategy - 1/08/04                                                         NEW!                                   

Ground Systems

The Tracked Support Vehicle - 7/02/03                        
Wheeled Support Vehicles and Systems - 4/14/03    
Hybrid HMMWV - 2/10/03
Transportation Assault Battalion - 2/10/03
Amphibious Tracked Support Vehicle - 2/13/03
The HEMTT Duck - 4/14/03         
Combat Engineering Systems - 2/13/03
A Bradley Medium Tank - 3/10/03
A Future Abrams Tank - 6/18/03
Abrams Ammunition - 3/16/03
Better Cannibalization With Trailers - 3/10/03
Multirole Jeeps - 1/08/04                                                      NEW!
Light Infantry Systems - 3/16/03
Mechanized Infantry Systems - 3/16/03
Cavalry Regiment Systems - 3/16/03
Soldier Combat Systems - Lightening the Load - 6/06/03               
Stryke Out! - The Logistics Case Against the Stryker Program - 6/04/03        
The Future Failure of FCS and Land Warrior - 6/04/03
The Future U.S. Army - 7/29/03
Rethinking Netfires - 7/28/03
Defining the Peacekeeping Force - 7/28/03
The Future Army - Revisited - 1/08/04                               NEW!                   

Rotorcraft Systems:

The Helicopter Self-Deployment System - 2/10/03
Blackhawk - The Next Generation - 2/10/03
Stallions of the Future - 2/10/03
The Joint Transport Rotorcraft - 2/10/03
An Advanced Tactical Transport - 4/14/03
CAS / Recon Autogyros - The Flying Jeep - 9/11/03            

Fixed Wing Systems:

KC-33A: Aerial Transport System - 4/07/03        
Redefining the Hercules - 2/10/03
Filling Gaps - The C-17 for Homeland Defense - 2/10/03
LTA - Heavy Lift in the 21st Century - 2/13/03
Military Roles for the Boeing 767
- 2/10/03
Rethinking the UAV
- 2/10/03
The Future Bomber Force - 3/27/03
The Future of Tactical Fighter Aviation - 5/19/03
Joint Strike Fighter Won't Fly - 7/03/03
The Skycat 1000 - A Brand New Day - 7/28/03
The Coming of Age of Missile Defense - 7/28/03
The F/A-22 Raptor - What Transformation REALLY Is - 9/11/03

Naval Systems:

LHD Carriers - 2/10/03
HSV - Liberty Ship for the 21st Century - 2/13/03
The Future Submarine Force - 2/10/03
A 21st Century Monitor - the Abrams HoverTank - 5/01/03          
Future Combat Vessels - 5/01/03                                    
The Future Surface Warfare Fleet - 5/01/03                    
Towed Support Platforms - 5/01/03                              

Communication Systems

Extreme JTRS - A Combat Data Infrastructure - 4/04/03
Gunning For Space - 2/10/03
The U-2 for Tactical Operations Support - 2/11/03
Communicating with the Airborne Laser (ABL ) - 2/10/03
Global Language Translation - 2/10/03

Additional Articles From the Author

Why Bush Won't Be Re-Elected - 9/23/03               
Betting on Terror?  Don't Kill FutureMAP! - 7/30/03
A Blueprint for Homeland Defense - 2/28/03
Why TIA Will Never Work and Alternatives That Will - 2/28/03
Cyberwar Solutions - 2/28/03
Why the Draft Won't Work - 3/10/03
Why "Fly Before You Buy" Doesn't Work - 4/14/03       
Solving the "Health Care Crisis" - 4/14/03
A Real National Energy Plan - 5/19/03                           
Real Urban Training: Blowing Up Fort Drum - 5/19/03            
A Running Commentary on the War in Iraq