U.S. IRAQ CASUALTY ANALYSIS AS OF DECEMBER 29, 2004

The following is the best analysis of open-source information of the 2nd U.S./Iraq war to December 29, 2004. The 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne) has undertaken this imperfect study to get at the essence of this non-linear conflict TODAY because our men need better strategy, tactics and equipment NOW not 10 years from now too late after the historians are done splitting hairs and our graveyards are full.

http://lunaville.org/warcasualties/Summary.aspx
www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/forces/casualties
www.pigstye.net/iraq/wd.php?sort=state&page=6
www.worldmessenger.20m.com/uscasualties.html

Percentage Calculator

http://homepages.ihug.com.au/~shane007/maths/percent.html

UPDATE 2008: Light Infantry Narcissists don't want to be reminded they are not bulletproof

...and that they need M113 Gavin light tracked tanks/APCs to protect them....

Iraq war costs power points

BilmesNatlPressClub1.2.13.08IRAQwar_cost.ppt

This shows the light infantry on foot and in trucks are most definitely getting their asses kicked and all the vain AmeroFascist bragging doesn't hold up. Same as Vietnam, too.

1 = American killed

15 X = Americans wounded

This study also shows the true human and medical costs of broken light infantry mentality extends for many many years afterwards until all the vets die.

1 out of every 2 Soldiers deployed to an all-out war end up on VA medical disability

Every 100, 000 Soldiers that end up on disability costs us $1 BILLION each year

So if we insist on perpetually keeping 200, 000 troops 24/7/365 in Iraq/Afghanistan, 100, 000 will leave the service as destroyed people for the rest of their lives costing us $1B each year until they all die off

So far 333, 000 are on VA rolls getting benefits = $3B/year

Another 400, 000 vet claims pending so this could rise to $$7B/year

4. So why do we support this crap?

$3B EVERY WEEK is being spent in Iraq alone, that's $158B/year

5 years = $750+ B

Most of the $$$ is going to military people and junk weapons profiteers. Willing victims and victim-izers all using AmeroFascistist pride and sunk cost excuses to keep on occupying a country that doesn't belong to us and propping up a Islamic Shia factionocracy that the majority of the Iraqi people do not support. "Democracy, shamocracy" by the greedy neocons.

Defintely Iraq will be the biggest quagmire EVER for the American people EVER all thanks to flag-waving, "christian" Satanist GWB. The 4, 000+ death toll would be much higher were it not for advanced medical treatment. Meaning, we'd have over 50, 000 dead by now if we were saddled with Vietnam medical technology which would at least alert the public of an ineptly conducted war to get the BS to stop. So having better medicine actually prolongs wars helping racketeers and hinders public revolt against it, just as the M16's tiny 5.56mm rationale that it would take 3 enemy Soldiers out of the fight by requiring them to care for a wounded man rather than bury a dead comrade. Iraq is GWB's version of 5.56mm-ing the American people to death. Meaning Americans need to wake up and develop a more accurate view of the world and not think all is AOK just because 50, 000 have not died in war. 40, 000 die EACH YEAR in car crashes and Americans don't do squat.

Washington Post
May 17, 2006
Pg. C1

Strategic Retreat?

HBO Says Army Brass Initially Rallied Around 'Baghdad ER,' But Soldiers Are Mostly MIA at Screening in Washington

By Paul Farhi, Washington Post Staff Writer

It's not who attended Monday's screening of the war documentary "Baghdad ER" that disappointed the film's producers, but rather who didn't. The National Museum of American History's theater was mostly full -- of civilians.

Only a few rows were filled by men and women dressed in the crisp, olive-drab uniforms of the U.S. Army. And that was a huge disappointment and a potent symbol for HBO, the network that produced the film -- a harrowing look at a combat support hospital in Iraq -- which will debut Sunday.

HBO executives say that top Army officials expressed enthusiasm for the documentary in March, but that the Pentagon's support has waned. They believe the military is troubled by the film's unflinching look at the consequences of the war on American Soldiers, and that it might diminish public support.

The documentary, shot over 2 1/2 months in mid-2005, contains graphic and disturbing footage of Soldiers reeling from their wounds -- in some cases, dying of them -- as Army medical personnel try to save them. The film illustrates the compassion and dedication of the staff of the 86th Combat Support Hospital in Baghdad. But it also has many gruesome images, such as shots of Soldiers' amputated limbs being dumped into trash bags, and pools of blood and viscera being mopped from a busy operating room floor. At one point, an Army chaplain, reciting last rites for a Soldier, calls all the violence "senseless."

"Maybe people [at the Pentagon] feel the truth will discourage people" from backing the war, Sheila Nevins, president of HBO's documentary unit, said after the invitation-only screening. "The film certainly tells you what could happen in a war, but it's also about the heroism, courage and dedication of our troops.

"I can't quite figure out their reaction. I was hoping this audience would be covered in green."

Pentagon spokesman Paul Boyce said the Army went to great lengths to support the HBO project, including giving filmmakers prolonged and intimate access to the hospital. It also made the Soldiers featured in the film available for media interviews and hosted screenings on 22 military installations.

"We believe [the film] is a very thorough representation of the professionalism of the military medical community, and reflects the ethos of our Soldiers," said Boyce, who attended Monday's screening. "Although we're grateful to work with people who accurately portray the role of U.S. Army, we can't endorse every project to the level and desire of some of the groups we work with."

The network screened the film in mid-March for senior Army officials, including Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey, and received an enthusiastic response, said Richard Plepler, HBO's executive vice president. One retired general, whom Plepler did not identify, told him the film " 'captured the soul of the U.S. Army,' " the executive recalled. Said Plepler: "We were obviously very proud to have received that embrace, and we were looking forward to working with the Army in the coming months."

Thereafter, Plepler said, the Army's support began to evaporate. The network's offer to co-sponsor a screening of the film this week at Fort Campbell, Ky., the home of the 86th, was turned down by the Pentagon without explanation. The Army wasn't an official sponsor of Monday's screening, and none of the service's highest-ranking officers or senior medical personnel attended, despite HBO's invitation.

Several of the medical specialists featured in the documentary, including Col. Casper P. Jones III, the commander of the 86th CSH, attended this week's screening and were accorded a prolonged standing ovation at the film's conclusion.

The Army's Surgeon General, Lt. Gen. Kevin Kiley, sent out a memo to Army medical personnel last week, alerting them to the film and asking them to remain vigilant about any adverse reactions to it.

Boyce downplayed the absence of the Army's top brass from the screening, saying: "The heroes of [the] documentary don't have stars on their shoulders. The stars are the wounded Soldiers, doctors, nurses and chaplains who are there supporting those Soldiers on the battlefront. This is not about a particular general." Nevertheless, he said, there were four colonels among the 40 or so Soldiers at the screening.

Among the guests in attendance was Paula Zwillinger, whose son, marine Lance Cpl. Robert Mininger, 21, died in Iraq from injuries from a roadside bomb. Zwillinger said in an interview that she didn't know exactly how her son died until the film's producers -- Joseph Feury, Jon Alpert and Matthew O'Neill -- contacted her as they were editing the film. Mininger's death is chronicled in a prolonged sequence at the end of "Baghdad ER."

She called the film a gift. "It gave me peace. At least I know he was with someone, and didn't die alone," she said.

Despite the grim subject matter, Zwillinger said: "I am positive about this film. It needs to be shown. I want the world to know this is reality. War is graphic, war is raw, war hurts. And we need more support for our troops, no matter what we think of the war."

WOUNDED

http://lunaville.org/warcasualties/Summary.aspx

Pentagon says as of December 4, 2004

Americans wounded

Army Forward Surgical Teams must be in tracked M113 Gavin armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) configured as mobile trauma units to respond faster by being closer to action than wheeled Humvee trucks; troops should be in armored tracks to armor protect them so they do not get wounded in first place!

www.reocities.com/skedco2000/nlbmedicalthreats.htm

Success or horror story? - More GIs surviving battlefield injuries

www.yahoo.com/_ylh=X3oDMTB2MXQ5MTU3BF9TAzI3MTYxNDkEdGVzdAMwBHRtcGwDaW5kZXgtaWU-/s/223737>

More GIs surviving battlefield injuries

Top Stories - Chicago Tribune

By Tom Hundley Tribune foreign correspondent

The flight from Baghdad to the snow-dusted forests of southwest Germany takes about six hours. The planes arrive every day, bearing broken Soldiers from the battlefields of Iraq (news - web sites).

Some are walking; others, heavily sedated, are on stretchers. In the most severe cases, ghastly abdominal wounds have been left open, covered only with a clear plastic bag. From the airfield, they are loaded onto a bus for the short drive to the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, the U.S. military's largest hospital in Europe.

If you've made it this far, you're almost home and your chances are looking pretty good," said Maj. Kendra Whyatt, head nurse for the hospital's orthopedic unit.

Indeed, one of the achievements in the Iraq war has been a dramatic increase in the percentage of Soldiers who survive combat injuries that a decade ago would have almost certainly been fatal. The downside is a lengthening roster of Soldiers with permanent injuries that will preclude a normal life.

A new study published in the current issue of the New England Journal of Medicine (news - web sites) showed that in Iraq and Afghanistan (news - web sites), 1,004 of the 10,369 Soldiers injured in battle through mid-November had died, a lethality rate of 10 percent.

During World War II, the rate was about 30 percent; it dropped to 25 percent during the Korean War and 24 percent during Vietnam, the study found. It remained at 24 percent during the Persian Gulf war of 1990-91.

The sharp decline in the fatality rate comes even as the lethality of modern weapons increases and the wounds they inflict become more devastating," said Dr. Atul Gawande, a surgeon at Brigham and Women's Hospital in Boston who researched and wrote the article in the New England Journal.

Military officials and medical professionals attribute the higher survival rates to improved body armor, advances in battlefield medical care and a rapid evacuation system that can get a wounded Soldier from the battlefield in Iraq to the well-equipped emergency room in Landstuhl within 10 hours.

What we are seeing here is a lot of blast injuries: burns, amputations, broken arms and legs--fairly traditional orthopedic injuries, but much more traumatic than in the past," Whyatt said.

The body armor protects vital organs, but it means doctors are treating increasingly severe wounds to unprotected areas--arms, legs and face. Double and even triple amputations are not uncommon. Facial disfigurements and eye and brain injuries are also increasing.

Body armor has done wonderful things, Kevlar helmets have done wonderful things," said Whyatt. "We are getting people to the hospital that would never have made it this far in the past.

Whyatt and Gawande agree that the key to survivability has been the development of Forward Surgical Teams--FSTs or Fast Teams, as the Army calls them--and improvements in the medical evacuation system.

Each Fast Team consists of four surgeons and 16 support personnel traveling in six Humvees and pushing ever closer to the front lines. They can set up a four-bed field hospital in less than an hour.

The emphasis is on "damage control, not definitive repair," wrote Gawande, who also is on the faculty of the Harvard School of Public Health.

Teams pack off liver injuries, staple off perforated bowel, wash out dirty wounds--whatever is necessary to stop bleeding and control contamination," he wrote.

Next, the wounded Soldier must be taken to either a combat support hospital in Iraq or on a plane to Germany as quickly as possible, which is why abdomens can be left open with surgical pads and clamps left in.

From the time of being wounded to being in our operating room, it takes about 10 hours," said Col. Richard Jordan, an Army doctor who is chief of the Deployed Warrior Center at Landstuhl.

The evacuation chain has been remarkable," he said. "Getting wounded Soldiers to this level of care in less than a day is really important."

Severely wounded Soldiers usually spend no more than three or four days in Germany before they are transferred to military hospitals in the U.S.

Gawande notes that the average time from battlefield to arrival in the U.S. is four days; during the Vietnam War, it was 45 days. Since hostilities began, Landstuhl has treated more than 18,000 patients from Iraq, 23 percent of whom were considered battle casualties. The rest were treated for illnesses and injuries unrelated to combat.

During last month's U.S.-led attack on Fallujah, Iraq, the hospital treated 459 battle casualties and had to add 10 beds to its intensive care unit. But its busiest day was Aug. 20, 2003, after a car bomb hit the UN compound in Baghdad. That incident brought 165 patients to Landstuhl.

Jordan described the increased survival rate as a "two-edged sword" because it forced doctors to make increasingly more difficult choices about amputations and left survivors to cope with the results.

The ability to survive is something we ought to be thankful for, but the rehab is very tough for these kids and their families," Jordan said.

In the New England Journal article, Gawande describes the case of an airman who survived devastating injuries in a mortar attack outside Balad, Iraq, last September. After damage-control surgery that included a leg amputation and colostomy, he was transported to Landstuhl and then to Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington.

Injuries like his were unsurvivable in previous wars," Gawande wrote. "The cost, however, can be high. The airman lost one leg above the knee, the other in a hip disarticulation [separation at the hip joint], his right hand, and part of his face. How he and others like him will be able to live and function remains an open question."

It is a question that makes military medical professionals uncomfortable.

Yes, it does raise ethical issues," Gawande said in a telephone interview. "No one questions the saving of a life, [but having saved the patient's life] we have to help him lead a good life. We have to help him recover physically and emotionally."

The military now is upgrading its facilities for Soldiers facing prolonged rehabilitation with a new $10 million amputee training center at Walter Reed. It also has eased rules to allow more Soldiers with amputations to remain on active duty.

The advances in battlefield medicine and the particular circumstances of the war in Iraq have raised another ethical question: How much care should be extended to Iraqi civilians or enemy fighters?

As physicians, we are obliged to take care of anybody in need," Gawande said. "But there has not been a clear answer or policy from the military on this."

Members of coalition forces and contractors of various nationalities who are injured or fall ill receive the same level of care as U.S. Soldiers. They are evacuated to Landstuhl if necessary. Iraqi nationals, however, are treated only in Iraq.

With U.S. forces likely to stay in Iraq for years, and military field hospitals turning into more permanent facilities, the obligation to care for the local population will increase.

This has become apparent in Baghdad's Green Zone, where a combat support hospital has taken over what had been an Iraqi pediatric hospital.

Gawande said the military recognizes that its doctors and nurses can help win the battle for "hearts and minds" in Iraq, but it must also deal with serious security concerns. "Your fear is that someone will put a bomb with a baby," he said.

KILLED

There have been 1,471 coalition troop deaths, 1,331 Americans killed, 75 Britons, seven Bulgarians, one Dane, two Dutch, two Estonians, one Hungarian, 19 Italians, one Latvian, 16 Poles, one Salvadoran, three Slovaks, 11 Spaniards, two Thai and nine Ukrainians in the war in Iraq as of December 24, 2004. (Graphical breakdown of casualties). The list below is the names of the Soldiers, marines, Airmen, Sailors and Coast Guardsmen whose families have been notified of their deaths by each country's government. At least 9,981 U.S. troops have been wounded in action, according to the Pentagon. The Pentagon does not report the number of non-hostile wounded.

CAVEAT: Lying USMC does not admit to how its men were killed so many of these deaths are by roadside bombs and not the minimal assumption of bullets killing them which to the narcissistic marine mind appears more "heroic" because it implies the .marine was fighting back compared to driving by a place on the road and getting blown up by the enemy pushing a button. 240 primarily USMC deaths are unclear accounting for 18.03% of all deaths. Therefore we will factor in only the deaths we know about--- 1, 091 known death causes.

Where did they die?

On foot or in tents/buildings deaths: 658

In aircraft deaths: 83

*Wheeled Cash Cows 

There are over 130,000 troops in Iraq, while most drive in 12,000 Humvee trucks, the lucky ones move in about 500 M1 Abrams 70-ton heavy, M2 Bradley 33-ton medium and 1, 700 M113 Gavin 11-ton light tracked armored fighting vehicles. DoD/Army refuses to properly up-armor the tracked AFVs lest they be too successful. There are about 300 19-ton Stryker (LAV-3) and 100 14-ton LAV-1 (USMC) rubber-tired armored trucks in Iraq at any given time. Don't let the weights of these thinly skinned trucks fool you--its composed primarily of drivetrains, suspensions and oversized box that has to fit on top of this conglomeration of fragile moving parts and 8 wheels with 8 air-filled rubber tires--NOT armor protective thickness. Out of 15,000 ground vehicles, LAVs constitute less than 2% of all the ground vehicles in Iraq, yet they contributed to 4% of all Soldiers/marine deaths indicated by the * in the death narratives, almost twice the death rate ratio for their low numbers.

 

USMC LAV-1 dead 22

Army Stryker Dead 30

___________________________________________

                                52 out of 1, 372 dead = 3.9%

 

Despite slapping $ Billions of dollars of mental computer aids to try to skirt around enemy contacts and extra armor, Humvee and LAV trucks continue to roll-over and be ambushed due to their road bound nature, killing their Soldiers/marines. Weighed down by these extra desperate pounds focused on narrow tires and fragile suspension, drivetrains and steering mechanisms, the Humvees and LAVs are constantly breaking down requiring millions of dollars of on-scene civilian contractors to keep the battered trucks running. Armored cars/trucks are so costly even within their own units their support personnel ride in unarmored trucks, creating an unbalanced and vulnerable overall force structure. The idea of buying new thinly armored trucks as a means to "transform" the force--be it Army or marine---is simply tactically unsound and economically not feasible.

How did they die?

Small Arms Fire: 228/1091 = 20.89% of all deaths

 44 killed because they were in inadequately protective wheeled HEMTT, Humvee, Stryker wheeled trucks

See death narratives coded S-1 

9 killed because Army refuses to attach top and gunshields to M1 Abrams, M2 Bradleys, M113 Gavins

 See death narratives coded S-2

 142 killed because they were on foot or in flimsy above ground buildings/shacks without Interceptor Body Armor, weapons gunshields or ISO container "Battle Boxes"

 See death narratives coded S-3

 34 killed by despair/suicide due to blind obedience, snobby U.S. military culture that promotes inaction and days filled with busywork instead of hands-on weapons/vehicle training that could prevent accidental discharges

See death nrratives coded S-4 or S-4

 Roadside and Car Bombs/Land Mines 368/1091 = 33.7% of all deaths

 

344 killed because they were in inadequately protective wheeled HEMTT, Humvee, Stryker wheeled trucks or on foot

See death narratives coded B-5 and B-5

 8 killed because Army refuses to attach extra underbelly/side armor to M113 Gavins

See death narratives coded B-6

 10 killed because design flaw of Bradley has side armor with no spacing from hull, fuel tank in vehicle center too close to turret ammunition

See death narratives coded B-7

5 killed because Army refuses to attach extra underbelly armor to M1 Abrams, M2 Bradleys to counter the "threat from below" which has killed more Soldiers since Vietnam than any other cause

 See death narratives coded B-8

 Accidents, Medical:  249 deaths out of 1091 = 22.82% of all deaths

40 killed because wheeled vehicles especially those with make-shift armor are exceedingly top-heavy and overturn easy

See death narratives coded ACC-9

3 killed because Bradley with overly large, 2-man turret makes the vehicle top-heavy. See death narratives coded ACC-10

8  killed due to constant need of replacing fragile rubber tires on numerous trucks; also driving skill incompetence due to lack of training in garrison. See death narratives coded ACC-11

61 killed due to crushing/fire by being in a weak wheeled truck, could have survived in a tracked AFV if properly restrained. See death narratives coded ACC-12

10 killed due to being thrown or falling from from vehicle.

See death narratives coded ACC-13

13 killed goofing off in former dictator palaces and swimming in rivers.

See death narratives coded ACC-14

14 drowned because vehicle he was in does not float/swim (Humvees, Strykers etc.)

See death narratives coded ACC-15

14 died due to poor health in reserve/guard system that offers no medical or dental care to them prior to mobilization, on-scene defibrillators/medics not at troop training events, living areas

See death narratives coded ACC-16

In the U.S. military in garrison we live in denial of the fact that in modern land combat TROOPS WILL MOVE AROUND BY MOTOR VEHICLES (light narcissistic units are the worst about this still dreaming that they walk wherever they go), yet all vehicles are parked so as to reduce wear/tear and increase readiness numbers reported in to make officers look good. Consider Ward Cleaver the father in the old TV show "Leave it to Beaver" who kept his family car parked and when his sons/friends borrowed it they with their low driving skills/maturity got it stuck. Garrison U.S. military officials have same paternalistic, condescending keep-the-car-parked mentality towards subordinates. They'd rather keep Soldiers constantly sleepless and tired getting up before crack of dawn and then doing sports PT and mindless lawn care and paperwork than actual combat driving and outfitting vehicles with weaponry/armor. Drivers skills are negligible, when we actually "do it for real" in combat fatal accidents are sure to follow. Humvees don't even carry a spare tire! How are Soldiers going to train to raise a vehicle and change a tire shredded by gunfire/explosion or burned to the rims in combat if the vehicle itself is in a state of denial? The "run-flat will suffice" hubris plays into the overall wheeled Army laziness. Tow bars are never used to actually tow vehicles in training to avoid risk/danger (protect NCOERs/OERs) re: the Tillman Ranger debacle in Afghanistan. The wheeled Humvee/Stryker U.S. military is symptomatic of a phony outfit that is on full-time taxpayer payroll pretending to look warlike with SUVs painted in camouflage but unarmored and unarmed that doesn't want to fight which requires tracked, armored combat vehicles and taking risks in training to gain required driving skills. The Army brass hope the Air force will bomb the enemy into submission and their subordinates can then roll in on rubber tired SUVs bringing along their transplanted garrison Army daily routine, maybe picking off a "few bad apples" with their rifle for an otherwise uneventful occupation while receiving hazardous duty pay and earning a combat patch.

Clearing supply roads is a "rear area" dirty job for underclass MPs who rove around in Humvees and do not physically occupy and cover every meter of the threatened roads---as infantry could do if assigned as pickets. Since Army linear war doctrine doesn't allow this, truck drivers are getting blasted to bits in Iraq/Afghanistan. In typical weak, co-dependant stay-in-you-lane behavior, those in the trucks simply try to speed as fast as they can to somehow evade a saboteur with a finger on a button that sets off an explosive charge at the speed of light. When accidents happen by enemy ambush or driver decisions/mistakes and collisions are magnified in these flimsy wheeled trucks at these excessive speeds, their bodies crush and fuel tanks burst causing fires and explosions killing the men inside. While tracked AFVs are more robust in collisions due to their armored bodies and should be the minimum transportation standard on the non-linear battlefield (NLB), the truth is that Soldiers cannot afford to ride in them while in seat belts and when they collide or turn over they are killed by being crushed or thrown from the sudden stop. We need to face this reality and develop a belt that has a safety cord at the rear that reels out so ther Soldier is not stuck to his seat so he can fight from his tracked AFV but stops reeling out in event of a sudden stop to secure the man from being thrown. We also need to invest in infantry and armor actually securing our supply roads even if its not "sexy" and ego gratifying for the combat arms troops to do so. Without supplies we cannot exist. 

Rocket-Propelled and Hand Grenades: 93/1091 = 8.52% of all deaths

55 killed because they were in soft-skin wheeled trucks easily penetrated or had to dodge RPG/AKM fires, did not have or failed to use vehicle smoke grenades to mask selves

See death narratives coded G-17

5 killed because they were in overly large AAV7s or Bradleys without required reactive armor tiles or top shields and/or didn't use vehicle smoke grenades or engine smoke to mask selves

See death narratives coded G-18

23 killed because they were on foot or in tents/flimsy buildings and blasted by RPG explosions

See death narratives coded G-19

3 killed because they did not know how to properly load/fire RPG rockets which have a booster charge that has to be fitted to rear of rocket before inserting into the launcher and firing

See death narratives coded G-20

 Mortars/Large rocket bombardments:  65 deaths out of 1091 = 5.95% of all deaths 

58 could have been saved had they been in dug-in ISO container "Battle Boxes" that can be moved around so we do not present a fixed target or live in former dictator palaces

See death narratives coded RM-21

7 should have been in a WAR mode in a tracked AFV for a short combat tour that can be moved not trying to bring all the comforts of home and garrison mentality for 12 month tours

See death narratives coded RM-22

Aircraft Shoot-Downs:  75 deaths out of 1091 = 6.87% of all deaths

47 killed in Army aircraft painted in wrong camouflage green in blue sky over desert tan Iraq (Army sin)

See death narratives coded A-23

16 killed in aircraft without adequate infared countermeasures in addition to being in wrong camo

See death narratives coded A-24

3 killed in aircraft without armor protection (USMC sin)

See death narratives coded A-25

3 killed flying in an unarmored fast jet instead of an armored A-10 to do CAS (USAF sin)

See death narratives coded A-26

6 killed in aged aircraft that should be replaced but can't because V-22 doesn't work

See death narratives coded A-27

Who could have been saved had they been better equipped?

CAVEAT: "At least" the following lives could have been saved because we do not know exact cause of death for the primarily USMC deaths described in vague terms. Actual lives that could have been saved would no doubt be much higher.

392 lives could have been saved If troops who died were mounted in amphibious M113 Gavin armored tracks instead of Humvee, Stryker trucks or walking on foot. If they had gunshields on their individual weapons, many face, neck and arm deaths/injuries could have been avoided, too.Details:

www.reocities.com/paratroop2000/armoredhmmwvsstrykersfail.htm

www.reocities.com/equipmentshop/hmmwv.htm

www.reocities.com/equipmentshop/gunshield.htm

 S-1 + S-3 + ACC-9 + ACC-11 + ACC-12 + ACC-15 + G-17 + G-19 + RM-22  =

 42 + 142 + 40 + 8 + 61 + 14 + 55 + 23 + 7 =  392

359 lives could have been saved if the troops who died had been in M113 Gavins tracks properly up-armored and gunshielded instead of vulnerable, armor-limited wheeled trucks or neglected M113s. Details:

www.reocities.com/equipmentshop/m113combat.htm

 S-2 + B-5 + B-6 =

 9 + 344 + 6 = 359

159 lives could have been saved if Soldiers were in dug-in, fortified ISO container "Battle Boxes" instead of flimsy tents, above ground buildings and occupying former Saddam palaces, drowning in swimming pools and generally easily targeted by enemies. Details:

www.reocities.com/strategicmaneuver/battleboxes.htm

S-3st + B-5St + G-19st + RM-21+ ACC-14  (code RED and St for Static Situation) =

36 + 38 + 14 + 58 + 13 = 159

20 lives could have been saved if M2 Bradleys had proper armor, external fuel tanks, and shields atop smaller 1-man autocannon turret. Details:

www.reocities.com/equipmentshop/mechinfantry.htm

B-7 + B-8 + G-18 =

10 + 5 + 5 = 20 

8 lives could have been saved if M1 Abrams had belly armor, top shields

B-8 + ACC-10 =

5 + 3 = 8

47 lives could have been saved if helicopters were in proper gray camouflage with IRCMs, and troops equipped with bail-out parachutes if flying a flight profile above 1000 meters to avoid enemy small arms fires. Details:

 www.reocities.com/equipmentshop/escape.htm

9 lives could have been saved if proper armored A-10s were used over Iraq instead of giving the sexy fast fighter-bombers/pilots a chance to bomb civilians in buildings, and the failed V-22 cancelled and safer helicopers bought by USMC. Details:

www.reocities.com/equipmentshop/mas.htm

www.reocities.com/equipmentshop/aircommandos.htm

www.reocities.com/usarmyaviationdigest/mas.htm

www.reocities.com/equipmentshop/trail2aircraft.htm

14 lives could have been saved if reservists/guardsmen had annual medical/dental care prior to mobilization, and defibrillators/medics on-scene at troop living areas and physical training events. Details:

www.reocities.com/paratroop2000/realreadyreserve.htm

www.reocities.com/skedco2000/nlbmedicalthreats.htm

GRAND TOTAL OF LIVES THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SAVED IF DoD/MILITARY WERE COMPETENT: 1,008

If U.S. military culture was not narcissistic and blind obedience based: 1, 046

LEGEND

B = Bombs, car, truck, roadside, land mines

S = Small arms fire, bullets

? = cause not stated, typically USMC dishonesty to portray death as heroic in a gunslinger firefight and not a one-sided enemy attack by bomb. Probably a small arms fire death but many are RPG and bomb deaths USMC refuses to admit to because it would imply criminal incompetence on their part for not placing their men in adequately armored tracked AFVs before the war in opposition to their narcissistic light foot infantry hubris

G = Grenades hand or rocket

RM = Rockets, artillery, mortars

ACC = Accidents or medical

A = Aircraft shoot downs

CAN = Cannon fire

BLUE = vulnerable vehicle related. Also implies deaths that could have been avoided had Soldier been in a multiple armor layed M113 Gavin light tracked AFV that would not have rubber tire ills. ACC Accidents in blue are vehicular and reveals lack of sleep and overall training in garrison before the war with vehicles ala "Leaver it to Beaver" syndrome. A sturdy tracked AFV does not crumple and catch fire as flimsy wheeled trucks do after a collision.

RED = death related to foot and bad building vulnerability

St = static situation

PINK = aircraft related

NATION-STATE WAR

For the first few months of the second U.S.-Iraq war, it was our organized armed forces versus the organized armed forces of Iraq. During a nation-state clash, both sides are totally paranoid and move with only survival and victory as their driving forces. The U.S. military imbued with the hubris of Alvin and Heidi Toffler's mentality that we are in a new "third wave" where physical armor protection and mobility doesn't matter wanted to "bombard & occupy" using air strikes steered by computers. Details:

www.reocities.com/transformationunderfire

So after a needless "shock & awe" air bombing that didn't kill a single Iraqi leader, the Army's tracked 3rd Infantry Division raced to take Baghdad through 2D maneuver while the marines primarily in wheeled trucks got bogged down and took extensive casualties. Many Iraqis were killed and left homeless and without utilities for no reason. Saddam's regime fell but "the clock was ticking" on how long the good will of the Iraqis would last. Saddam and followers were able to escape to the north because the weak 3D maneuver by the 173rd Airborne Brigade lacked parachute delivered tracked AFVs to rapidly fan out and block their escape routes.    

However, since the U.S. military still is organized with a non-warfighting underclass of support Soldiers under the assumption it will fight a LINEAR war with the enemy to the front and in the rear it safe for this underclass to act as fuel, ammo and "waterboys" for the narcissistic warriors. Details:

www.reocities.com/militaryincompetence/militarismsucks.htm

The truth is that the 10 division volunteer Army will never have the luxury of 100 divisions to fully pacify large land masses of enemies as the draft-mobilized Army of WWII had, but must bypass rear guards and strike the enemy nation-state's center of gravity and collapse them. This means that the support units following in the wake of maneuver combat elements cannot be a down-trodden underclass in unarmed and unarmored trucks. But when Jessica Lynch's 507th Maintenance unit fell behind due to wheeled vehicle break downs and then took a wrong turn into the enemy held town of Nasiryah and left the temporary clear wake of the 3rd Infantry Division they were easily wiped out by the enemy with automatic rifles (AKMs, AK47s) and RPGs.  USMC units turning along to their axis were nearby and rescued the few survivors. Details:

www.reocities.com/paratroop2000/armoredhmmwvsstrykersfail.htm

The marine casualties trying to take bridges near Nasiryah are accurately depicted in the Discovery Channel documentary via interviews and computer simulations. The marines through gross military incompetence do not have an effective "cavalry" in light tracked armored fighting vehicles (AFVs)  to forge ahead and determine routes for the main body, what is "go" and "no-go" terrain. Their Light Armored Reconnaissance units in LAV-1 8-wheeled, rubber tired trucks are dismal failures to act as cavalry since they are so thinly armored and vulnerable (huge internal fuel tank on left side right next to troops) commanders are reluctant to use them to make first contact with any enemy. Because LAVs are wheeled and essentially vehicles that need a path cleared for them, and the military spends most of its time on non-sense its not realized that these things are problems ahead of time, so solutions like smoke screens are options that are rehearsed and ready to go in time of war.    

The Army's casualties marching into Baghdad were less when in tracked AFVs but some still occurred because Bradleys were (are) not fitted with their required explosive reactive armor (ERA) tiles to stop RPGs and all of their tracked AFVs lacked top and gunshields despite the M113 Gavin's ACAV gunshield kits existing for 4 decades. Again, a road-bound, USMC LAR or Army Stryker unit is in no position to act as cavalry to route recon for tracked AFV main bodies which have greater mobility than they do! Unless of course, we want to weaken the entire attack to cater to the lowest common denominator wheeled trucks and surrender any chance of surprising the enemy by taking an unpredictable path. To his credit, the 3rd Infantry Division's commander, General Blount used feignts--false attacks in different directions exploiting his primarily tracked force's mobility to keep the enemy guessing his main effort would come from and he snatched the prize of getting to Baghdad first for the U.S. Army.

Thus, approaching Nasiriyah, USMC commanders did not have any verified routes and acted from a view of a map to send three rifle company main bodies forward and around the enemy held buildings to seize bridges over key rivers. Going off road would have been fine had they been in LIGHT tracked AFVs, but the marines were in 25-ton, bloated, huge boat-hull-shaped AAV7 amphibious tractors designed incorrectly to carry 25 men-at-a-time as ship-to-shore landing craft. One rifle company ad hoc mounted in AAV7s became stuck in mud. The other was pinned down at the bridge and in danger of being surrounded and wiped out. So the third company commander decided to go straight up the paved road to the bridge directly alongside enemy held buildings. AVV7s are huge targets, easy aimpoints for enemy rocket propelled grenade (RPG) gunners and several are hit and penetrated since they only have spaced applique' armor at their sides but not fully covering their bodies. Casualties in our report are shown by G but the USMC to date has not admitted to how their Nasiriyah deaths occured so they are marked by ? though in blue to signify our suspicion that they were vehicular deaths.. Troops fighting from AAV7 top hatches also do not have gunshields so they can be swept from their perches by AKM fire to not interfere with RPG gunner's aiming in on their vehicles. Dead by bullets shown by S. Compounding these chain of errors, the AAV7's 1-man turrets have weak machine gun armament unable to penetrate through thick concrete/cinder block buildings the enemy is fighting from. Tragically, several AAV7s packed with marines inside are hit by multiple RPGs and set on fire, killing several marines. The real tragedy is despite this, the USMC continues with the development of another bloated amtrack the Advanced AAV now renamed the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle or EFV when it is simply too big of a target on the modern battlefield where height is the number one visual signature give-away and aimpoint. The EFV has too many marines packed into too large of a target. Plentiful and smaller M113 Gavins are in storage that could be fitted with waterjets to swim from ship to shore that are very small AFVs that carry no more than a squad at a time. These are also light enough to FLY BY HELICOPTERS AT 100+ MPH to shore so they do not need the complicated waterskis and retractible tracks the EFVs have to just do 30 mph in the water where they can still strike a seamine and be exploded. EFVs are too heavy to fly by any helicopter in the world, but M113 "AmphiGavins" can be flown OVER sea mines.

Another incompetence is that the marines failed to use vehicle smoke generators to lay a smoke screen along their main body's flanks as they ran the gauntlet to the bridges to mask the enemy gunner's eyes so they would not have aim points for their RPGs and AKM assault rifles. This is not an isolated practice, look at photos of all our vehicles in action in Iraq and you will see their smoke grenade launchers have rubber caps on them meaning they are not loaded with grenades that if launched could spoil the aim of an enemy RPG or AKM gunner. The U.S. military simply on a daily basis spends all it time doing bullshit and not enough on perfecting combat technotactics. The failure to use smoke is just one symptom of a BS garrison quasi-draftee/volunteer Army without empathy and what-ifing what the enemy could do and then taking action as a professional force would. In the aftermath of its "Thunder Run" into Baghdad, the 3rd ID did figure this all out and requested the extra armor and shields but the corrupt Army brass so far has refused this to them because it threatens the wheeled Stryker cash cows they lust for to further their wheeled "Leave it to Beaver" mentality.

SUB-NATIONAL WAR

On May 2, President Bush landed on the aircraft carrier USS Lincoln and agreed with the banner flying overhead that the war was over and "mission accomplished." This hubris and pre-mature celebration reflects the neocon and Tofflerian/RMA mentality of DoD that all we have to do is bombard enemies with aircraft and then occupy them with troops driving around in rubber-tired trucks. "War" to Neocons/DoD is only against nation-state armies, hence on 9/12 there was no declaration of war against a sub national terrorist group. In this arrogance and snobbery, the linear structure of the Army would stop in place and spread out all over Iraq and begin living in former dictator Saddam Hussein's palaces, and the support underclass would continue to shuttle in vital supplies to keep the warfighting narcissists fat and happy.

The problem is the WAR WAS NOT OVER and the battlefield is still NON-LINEAR, with the enemy all over and growing in numbers as the U.S. occupation continued with security and power, water and sewage infrastructure broken still from the USAF air bombardment. Making matters worse, we did not restore social order and sent the Iraqi military home despite our promise to them of continued employment--a violation of U.S. honor and credibility not lost on those we had lied to. Soon our lazy "presence patrols" in rubber-tired HMMWV trucks began to be blown up and RPG and gunned down by AKM assault rifles by the Saddam loyalists who we allowed to escape because we did not employ an effective 3D maneuver in the north to block their escape routes. The Bush administration began their denials---which continue to the present that the war was indeed over and that only a "few bad apples" were the blame. Eventually, while we lived in comfort in former Saddam palaces months went by without Iraqis getting water, power and sewage running we had our combat arms Soldiers kicking in Iraqi homes in the middle of the night and taking away family members in hoods to Abu Gahraib prison to force out information on the whereabouts of Saddam and his lieutenants so we can raid by wheeled trucks other homes or bomb them with a JDAM bomb guided by a computer to a GPS map reference point. Emulating the failed strong-arm tactics of Diem in South Vietnam in 1954-1963, used to ordering privates around in garrison, Army officers over-reacted and played right into the hands of the rebels by becoming the "Ugly American" occupiers. What began as a small uprising led by former Saddam loyalists soon became a full fledged guerrilla war of national liberation from U.S. occupation.

IED non-sense to CYA military incompetence fact that they are command detonated land mines a threat we've known about for years but ignored...

As troops rotated into Iraq and became constantly ambushed they began to slap armor onto their trucks in a desperate effort to save their own lives. The brass cover their ass by calling these command detonated landmines "Improvised Explosive Devices" (IEDs) so it appears to be some new invention and therefore they are not to be blamed for American boys being killed and maimed.  While some lives are saved by sandbags and "hillbilly armor" many were lost and limbs mangled because DoD refuses to accept the fact that their "Radio Shack" view of war where only mental gadgets are needed fails miserably in the actual world of high explosives. Casualties from all sorts of car, human and roadside bombs are depicted by B.


Hunkering Down in Base Camps to reduce casualties so Bush can get re-elected

To increase Bush's chances of re-election U.S. troops hunkered down starting after the "bloody April" revolt began after 4 Blackwater civilians in unarmored wheeled SUVs wrre ambushed and their burned corpses were hung on the city bridge while nearby marines who swaggered in to take over that sector from the 82nd Airborne said they would be more gentle and win hearts and minds through their combined action platoon (CAP) concept of rifle squads living amongst an Iraqi family, did nothing. CAP was quickly scrapped as unworkable since the Iraqis now hates us and want us to leave, especially the Sunnis who we had double-crossed. However, as U.S. troops in their forward operating bases and former Saddam palaces and patrolled less in order to avoid getting blown up by roadside bombs, the rebels came to them and began to rocket and mortar our troops raising death tolls by rockets and mortars RM.

 Washington Post reporter Tom Ricks writes that Army war planner, Major Isaiah Wilson III revealed in a recent report that "his toughest criticism for Army commanders who, he concludes, failed to grasp the strategic situation in Iraq and so not did not plan properly for victory. He concludes that those who planned the war suffered from "stunted learning and a reluctance to adapt." Army commanders still misunderstand the strategic problem they face and therefore are still pursuing a flawed approach"

"Reluctance in even defining the situation . . . is perhaps the most telling indicator of a collective cognitive dissidence on part of the U.S. Army to recognize a war of rebellion, a people's war, even when they were fighting it," he comments.

The Bush neocons refuse to admit that we have overstayed our welcome in Iraq and our now fighting a growing rebellion of nationalists whgo simply want us to leave, not a small bunch of "bad apple" Islamists and former Saddam loyalists as we had no more than 1 year to restore legitimate civilian government in Iraq as GE CEO Jack Welch has concluded about human willingness to change.

        Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan

        Major Calls Effort in Iraq 'Mediocre'  

By Thomas E. Ricks

Washington Post Staff Writer

Saturday, December 25, 2004; Page A01 

The U.S. military invaded Iraq without a formal plan for occupying and stabilizing the country and this high-level failure continues to undercut what has been a "mediocre" Army effort there, an Army historian and strategist has concluded. 

"There was no Phase IV plan" for occupying Iraq after the combat phase, writes Maj. Isaiah Wilson III, who served as an official historian of the campaign and later as a war planner in Iraq. While a variety of government offices had considered the possible situations that would follow a U.S. victory, Wilson writes, no one produced an actual document laying out a strategy to consolidate the victory after major combat operations ended. 

"While there may have been 'plans' at the national level, and even within various agencies within the war zone, none of these 'plans' operationalized the problem beyond regime collapse" -- that is, laid out how U.S. forces would be moved and structured, Wilson writes in an essay that has been delivered at several academic conferences but not published. "There was no adequate operational plan for stability operations and support operations." 

Similar criticisms have been made before, but until now they have not been stated so authoritatively and publicly by a military insider positioned to be familiar with top-secret planning. During the period in question, from April to June 2003, Wilson was a researcher for the Army's Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group. Then, from July 2003 to March 2004, he was the chief war planner for the 101st Airborne Division, which was stationed in northern Iraq.  

A copy of Wilson's study as presented at Cornell University in October was obtained by The Washington Post.  

As a result of the failure to produce a plan, Wilson asserts, the U.S. military lost the dominant position in Iraq in the summer of 2003 and has been scrambling to recover ever since. "In the two to three months of ambiguous transition, U.S. forces slowly lost the momentum and the initiative . . . gained over an off-balanced enemy," he writes. "The United States, its Army and its coalition of the willing have been playing catch-up ever since."  

It was only in November 2003, seven months after the fall of Baghdad, that U.S. occupation authorities produced a formal "Phase IV" plan for stability operations, Wilson reports. Phase I covers preparation for combat, followed by initial operations, Phase II, and combat, Phase III. Post-combat operations are called Phase IV. 

Many in the Army have blamed Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon civilians for the unexpectedly difficult occupation of Iraq, but Wilson reserves his toughest criticism for Army commanders who, he concludes, failed to grasp the strategic situation in Iraq and so not did not plan properly for victory. He concludes that those who planned the war suffered from "stunted learning and a reluctance to adapt."  

Army commanders still misunderstand the strategic problem they face and therefore are still pursuing a flawed approach, writes Wilson, who is scheduled to teach at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point next year. "Plainly stated, the 'western coalition' failed, and continues to fail, to see Operation Iraqi Freedom in its fullness," he asserts.  

"Reluctance in even defining the situation . . . is perhaps the most telling indicator of a collective cognitive dissidence on part of the U.S. Army to recognize a war of rebellion, a people's war, even when they were fighting it," he comments.  

Because of this failure, Wilson concludes, the U.S. military remains "perhaps in peril of losing the 'war,' even after supposedly winning it."  

Overall, he grades the U.S. military performance in Iraq as "mediocre."  

Wilson's essay amounts to an indictment of the education and performance of senior U.S. officials involved in the war. "U.S. war planners, practitioners and the civilian leadership conceived of the war far too narrowly" and tended to think of operations after the invasion "as someone else's mission," he says. In fact, Wilson says, those later operations were critical because they were needed to win the war rather than just decapitate Saddam Hussein's government.  

Air Force Capt. Chris Karns, a spokesman for the U.S. Central Command, which as the U.S. military headquarters for the Middle East oversaw planning for the war in Iraq, said, "A formal Phase IV plan did exist." He said he could not explain how Wilson came to a different conclusion. 

Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, who as chief of the Central Command led the war planning in 2002 and 2003, states in his recent memoir, "American Soldier," that throughout the planning for the invasion of Iraq, Phase IV stability operations were discussed. Occupation problems "commanded hours and days of discussion and debate among CENTCOM planners and Washington officials," he adds. At another point, he states, "I was confident in the Phase IV plan." 

Asked about other officers' reaction to his essay, Wilson said in an e-mail Monday, "What active-duty feedback I have received (from military officers attending the conferences) has been relatively positive," with "general agreement with the premises I offer in the work." 

He said he has no plans to publish the essay, in part because he would expect difficulty in getting the Army's approval, but said he did not object to having it written about. "I think this is something that has to get out, so it can be considered," he said in a telephone interview. "There actually is something we can fix here, in terms of operational planning."  

In his analysis of U.S. military operations in 2003 in northern Iraq, Wilson also touches on another continuing criticism of the Bush administration's handling of Iraq -- the number of troops there. "The scarcity of available 'combat power' . . . greatly complicated the situation," he states.  

Wilson contends that a lack of sufficient troops was a consequence of the earlier, larger problem of failing to understand that prevailing in Iraq involved more than just removing Hussein. "This overly simplistic conception of the 'war' led to a cascading undercutting of the war effort: too few troops, too little coordination with civilian and governmental/non-governmental agencies . . . and too little allotted time to achieve 'success,' " he writes. 

Bush re-elected, Failure in Fallujah: destroying a city in order to "save it"...rebels escape and take-over Mosul; suicide bomber blows up Stryker mess tent 

Fallujah wasno "object lesson" to the rebels as the late Asad in Syria did to keep control of his Islamic fanatics: there was no surprise 3D maneuver to seal off city, it could be even argued that the GOs wanted the rebels to escape by the way they were broadcasting our intentions for weeks prior to the assault. With a populace of over 250,000 which left a city of empty buildings there was no more than 5,000 rebels left inside when the joint USMC/Army assault began. There will be no winning of "hearts/minds" for the 250,000 Fallujans when they return, either: sexy fighter-bomber aircraft bombing first instead of precision direct-fire 155mm Paladin self-propelled howitzers (SPHs) of verified enemy held targets to reduce collateral damage is sure to alienate the populace forever. On foot, without employing smokescreens marines move WWI style from building to building and suffer extensive, preventable casualties of over 33 dead and 300 wounded.  

In Najaf, the Army faced 17,000 rebels spread out over a much larger city and suffered almost ZERO CASUALTIES.  

Why? 

Because the Army made it a point to move its troops in tracked M2 Bradleys and M113 Gavins backed by the former's 25mm autocannon and escorting M1 Abrams 120mm main gun firepower. A recent after action review by a young officer is revealing: 

[Our force] consisted of 28 personnel and 5 M1114s (Up-armored HMMWVs). On 16AUG, xxxxx platoon was ordered to relieve a company of marines in a dilapidated six-story building 1200 meters east of the Ali Shrine. We parked our gun trucks at the local police station (TF HQ), and I advanced on the building with 18 personnel. I had to leave two Soldiers with each HMMWV left behind. We were transported in Bradleys, and received numerous RPG and small arms impacts during the advance.... We continued to engage targets up to 1000 m away with rifle, machine gun, and AT4 fire. We were also given permission to engage with precision fires into the exclusion area with the caveat that the Mosque and its grounds were not to be so much as scratched. We directed F-16 and Harriers in dropping 250 and 500 pound bombs less than 500 m from our position, and pinpointed enemy strongholds that were engaged by the Bradleys with 25mm fire. That night the task force launched its biggest attack of the campaign. While we directed AC-130 fires directly to our west, a company plus of M1s engaged the area from the cemetery in the north, and Bradleys from C 2-7 CAV attacked form the south. All resistance from outside the exclusion area ceased after the attack... sniper fire continued until 21AUG, when one of the SEALs, HM1 xxx, saw the muzzle flash from the enemy's rifle and directed Bradley fires onto the enemy hide, followed by every weapon I could bring to bear on the position. We took no further accurate sniper fire.

During this time, I regained the personnel that had been with the trucks defending the Police station. We secured the trucks at the station and brought the weapons forward.

So, while the Army is more successful in Najaf and suffer less casualties than the marines in Fallujah, word of this tracked AFV success and uselessness of Humvee trucks does not change the Army's current and future spending plans! HQDA persists in slapping on armor onto trucks in Iraq to deflect public criticism, one layer of armor adaptation all that is possible; tracks can have more by a factor of 28%---but DoD RMA/Army wheeled narcissists can't have their cash cows threatened! One armor layer already easily defeated by Iraqi rebels--look at death accounts---so called "up armored" Humvees already failing and Soldiers dying. Troops in close combat PARK their Humvees, so why are we wasting $150,000 on them?  

This article below warning about the 2,000 pound JDAM bomb was written before the estimated 100,000 Iraqis died in the months preceding the beginning of the war. Is it a wonder they want us to leave and this is the source of the rebellion NOT a minority of "dead enders"---the BIG LIE the Bushies and Red America wants to believe? The "1/4 pounder" JDAM (500 pounds is also too big). 

COIN pundits say we need to win the battle of "ideas", this ain't cuttin it. Conservatively we say the rebellion in Iraq is now as follows:  

25% Islamists

25% Saddam Loyalists

50% Nationalists: Want U.S. out of Iraq<-----Bushies don't admit this truth 

Maybe we should send Karl Rove to Iraq to take a "poll"? Yet another 50% glass half-empty reality the Bushies do not want to admit exists....You cannot kill an IDEA by destroying people and buildings, you must have a BETTER IDEA, right now we are trying to kill an idea (U.S. is unwanted occupier in Iraq) with air strikes and artillery upon Iraqi cities. When the 250,000 Fallujans return to their destroyed city, we will have 250,000 more rebels. 

We should have sealed Fallujah suddenly with Air-Mech-Strike forces suddenly (preserve OPSEC) using M113 Gavin air transportable tracked AFVs via CH-47D and CH-53E helicopters....then cleared the city rapidly SURGICALLY German WWII-style with tracked armor and assault guns (SP 155mms in direct-fire mode would do) with protected infantry with lots of combat engineers Percy Hobart-style with smokescreens, bulldozers with an eye towards not wiping out entire city blocks of homes. NOT French WWI-style leading with air strikes and indirect artillery fire to compensate for the vulnerabilities of USMC foot infantry by pre-emptively smashing dozens of buildings. 

The better idea to win 4th Generation War would be to minimize the "Ugly American" occupation presence in Iraq as the Brits learned to do in Northern Ireland after humbling ourselves and admitting the rebellion in Iraq is OUR FAULT for over staying our welcome and there is no magic solution of killing a "few thousand" trouble makers when the problem here is a MORAL one of not having a BETTER IDEA. 

www.newhousenews.com/archive/wood031303.html  

NATIONAL SECURITY 

New Workhorse of U.S. Military: A Bomb With Devastating Effects 

BY DAVID WOOD

c.2003 Newhouse News Service 

WASHINGTON -- It will fall silently and unseen from tthe distant sky, a cigar-shaped steel capsule hurtling down at 300 mph with a single deadly purpose. In the final moments, there might come a brief, chilling whir as tiny gears adjust its tail fins to nudge it closer to its target. At home, television viewers monitoring the war with Iraq will see the familiar gun-camera footage: cross hairs on a blurred image of a building and, as a Pentagon officer narrates, the flicker of a shadow and a bright flash before the tape runs out. 

On the ground, however, the work of the 2,000-pound Mark-84 JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) bomb, the new workhorse of the U.S. military, is just beginning. In nanoseconds it will release a crushing shock wave and shower jagged, white-hot metal fragments at supersonic speed, shredding flesh, crushing cells, rupturing lungs, bursting sinus cavities and ripping away limbs in a maelstrom of destruction. These and other effects, calculated and charted by Defense Department war planners in a predictive software program called "Bug Splat," are largely obscured by smoke and debris. But they may become a critical factor if the United States goes into a controversial war with Iraq. While the Pentagon's war plan is designed to minimize casualties, the inevitable civilian dead and wounded are sure to be seized on by opponents, particularly in the Arab world, as evidence of American perfidy.

The simple fact, says Dr. Harry W. Severance, an emergency physician and associate clinical professor at the Duke University Trauma Center, is that weapons like JDAM are designed to kill.

"People look at and calculate the effects and design those into the weapons," said Severance, a member of the American College of Emergency Physicians who advises state, federal and military agencies on blast injuries and triage. American officials, from President Bush on down, say the United States will do its utmost to conduct the war humanely.

In a recent briefing for reporters, a senior military officer explained that "Bug Splat ... is really a mathematical process that we can go to that shows, depending on the direction the bomb is actually falling, where the effects of that fragmentation from the bomb will go. 

"It's certainly not a science," said this officer, who cannot be identified under Pentagon rules. "I don't want to say there will be no casualties.  But it (Bug Splat) is a very good way to try to keep the number of casualties and the damage to a minimum." 

The Mark-84 JDAM, expected to star in the anticipated war, may crystallize these concerns. It is a 2,000-pound "dumb" or unguided bomb of the type used by U.S. forces for decades. What is relatively new, however, is a strap-on kit consisting of an inertial navigation system that guides the bomb toward the target, a satellite receiver, and tail fins for small final corrections in the dive toward an aim point determined by Global Positioning System satellites. 

Unlike the Pentagon's new Massive Ordnance Air Burst (MOAB) bomb, which is intended to blast clear wide areas of obstructions or structures, the Mark-84 JDAM bomb is a "pinpoint" weapon designed to kill and destroy smaller targets. The Pentagon argues the precision-guided JDAM can reduce unintended casualties. 

Thousands of JDAMS are stockpiled at Persian Gulf air bases. A thousand may be dropped on the war's first night, on reinforced bunkers and "soft" targets like military barracks and transportation facilities. While the technology of the Mark-84 JDAM is proudly hailed by the Pentagon and by the manufacturer, Boeing, no one in the Defense Department nor its research labs or weapons contractors would publicly discuss the actual effects of the munition as it detonates. Privately, however, engineers and weapons designers were eager to describe the mechanism. As the Mark-84 JDAM strikes the ground, its fuse ignites a priming charge that detonates 945 pounds of Tritonal, a silvery solid of TNT mixed with a dollop of aluminum for stability. 

The ensuing chemical reaction produces an expanding nucleus of hot gas that swells the Mark-84's 14-inch-wide cast steel casing to almost twice its size before the steel shears and fractures, showering a thousand pounds of white-hot steel fragments at 6,000 feet per second and driving a shock wave of several thousand pounds per square inch. Instantaneously, a fireball lashes out at 8,500 degrees Farenheit, and the explosion gouges a 20-foot crater and hurls off 10,000 pounds of rock and dirt debris at supersonic speed. 

Trauma physicians confronting the human wreckage divide casualties into four classes. One is injury from the blast itself, mostly caused by a pressure wave a hundred times or more the injury threshold of 15 pounds per square inch (psi). By comparison, a shock wave of 12 psi will knock over a standing person. 

A second class of injury is from the wind and debris that immediately follow the blast wave. A blast force of 4 psi -- far below the force of these winds -- can shatter glass and drive lethal fragments at 120 mph. Metal fragments will travel about 3,800 feet, nearly three-quarters of a mile. Bigger fragments of the bomb -- heavy pieces of the thick metal nose cone, for instance -- will sail out a mile and a half, a Defeense Department engineer said. 

A third set of injuries results either as bodies are picked up and thrown against something, or as part of a stationary body is ripped away. A fourth class takes in everything else, including burns from the fireball and crush injuries from falling debris. 

"The key to survival with a Mark-84 is to not be behind glass and not be behind something that's going to fail, like a concrete wall," said a Defense Department official who asked not to be identified. 

Almost no one survives primary blast injuries, experts say. The brutal shock wave, a force that far exceeds the pressure the atmosphere normally applies to the human body, smashes into and explodes body cavities of lesser pressure -- lungs, colon, bowels, even through the sinuses into the skull. The overpressure can burst individual cells and rupture critical blood vessels, forcing air through them and on into the heart and brain, causing instant death. 

"You really don't treat consequences of primary overpressure," said Dr. Michael McCalley, a physician and professor of public health and preventive medicine at Oregon Health and Science University in Portland. 

Third-class injuries also are almost always lethal. 

"The type of force that picks you up and throws you, where you get traumatic amputations, you're pretty much already dead from the blast," Severance said. 

Crush injuries, from the pressure wave or from falling rubble, can also be lethal. Crushing can break open muscle cells, dumping the contents into the capillaries and clogging critical blood vessels, McCalley said. That can cause cardiac problems, kidney failure and other complications difficult to treat in a war zone. 

"In a poor country like Iraq, you don't survive a crush injury," said McCalley, who recently returned from making a survey of public health facilities there. 

Surprisingly, many people who avoid the primary blast injuries of a munition like the Mark-84 survive its other effects -- severe burns from the fireball, losing chunks of flesh to flying debris, and crushed limbs. That's when emergency triage -- sorting out the dying from those who can be saved -- becomes critical.  

"You may have 85 to 95 percent of the victims of a major blast who are walking -- scared, covered with debris and dust, bbleeding from lacerations, and wanting somebody to help them right now," Severance said. "Those walking you can green-tag for later medical care. Five to 10 percent, these are people who need an operating room right now, and they are red-tagged. 

"Black tag? Today's your day to die," he said. 

Medical care in Iraq, according to the United Nations and other organizations, is minimal and declining. Iraq does not have an operative burn unit anywhere in the country, McCalley said, and no broad system of civil defense or bomb shelters. His survey found many towns have ambulances -- but often they are not equipped with defibrillators, intubators or other common emergency medical equipment. 

And with Iraq's hospital system in a shambles, McCalley said, "Where would the ambulances take people?" 

(David Wood can be contacted at david.wood@newhouse.com) 

Wheeled Stryker Brigade in Mosul cannot even defend itself and has lost control of the city 

The rebels displaced from Fallujah are now in Mosul and have blow up the vaunted Stryker brigade's mess tent killing over a dozen and wounding many other Soldiers. Where was this computer "situational awareness" that let a suicide bomber walk into your chow hall? Iraq combat recent experience shows that mounted patrols conducted inside tracked Bradleys with explosive reactive armor (ERA) tiles result in 3 RPG hits per vehicle; these same hits would strip away the Stryker's bird cage and expose its thin hull to catastrophic destruction by follow-on RPG strikes---so the Strykers are parked. This cedes control of the roads around Mosul to the rebels. The 1-2 punch of RPG teams to strip away bird cages was done in Grozny by the rebels there. The Stryker brigade lacking enough dismount infantry does not patrol on foot, either to stop mortar and rocket attacks into its Mosul encampments. Is this the "transformation" we want to do to the entire U.S. Army, making it impotent motorized infantry that cannot move or engage successfully in close combats (less than 1,000 meters) and is pinned down in the face of mere urban insurgents with AKMs, RPGs and roadside bombs?

SUMMARY/CONCLUSION 

The losses in Iraq due to qualitative military incompetence/refusal to adapt to non-linear, sub-national war are excessive for a volunteer force and if not curbed will destroy the U.S. military, particularly the Army. 

Death and Wounding 

In two years of war, 1, 371 have been killed, never to return to duty and 5, 301 have been wounded so severely they did NOT returned to duty within 72 hours and many are ruined for life. That's 6, 672 people destroyed. Add 4, 680 who have been wounded and will never be the same and as healthy as they once were, this comes out to 11, 352 Soldiers dead or now "damaged goods", or about 1 entire DIVISION of combat power lost to a very weak enemy out of an Army with only 10 divisions. Iraq so far has destroyed 1/10th of the U.S. Army! 

You can be crass and say that in WWII we lost more, or in Vietnam we lost more in one month etc. etc. but if you think this you forget we had a DRAFT in effect and we FORCED PEOPLE TO FIGHT AND DIE. We are halfway in between a Citizen-Soldier Army and a volunteer military far short of a professional force that can take on difficult assignments and adapt/overcome. People will "vote with their feet" and simply chose not to join if the odds of constant deployment, death and dismemberment stay the same or get worse.       

Deployment until you are killed or wounded? 

Consider that the active Army is 500,000 people. Right now 124,000 are deployed somewhere in the world. That's 1/5th of the Army in Iraq now. This means another 1/5th has just returned from Iraq and will rest for at least 1 year while another 1/5th is getting ready to replace the 1/5th in Iraq. This means 3/5ths of the Army is either in Iraq, has just returned from Iraq or are getting ready to go to Iraq. And the harsh truth is that the other 2/5th that stays home is composed of old men with more rank who control the purse strings and see the Army as their toy to tinker with as the younger men go to war and die without the armor protection and weaponry they need. Certainly we must rid much of this bloated Corps and Division command structure that exist to make middle aged men feel like they are young when they are not, and in so doing will create personnel slots for another 100,000 trigger pullers to reduce the optempo by a year for an endless occupation like Iraq. Getting rid of 100,000 closed minded narcissistic milicrats from the Army would do wonders for the morale of the entire organization by giving the lower ranks HOPE that their adaptation ideas will be implemented. 

Exit Strategies For Iraq

Christian Science Monitor

October 18, 2004 

While George W. Bush and John Kerry disagree on the legitimacy of the war in Iraq and how the occupation is being carried out, they generally share the same views on a U.S. exit strategy.  

But just as the planning for the peace proved overly optimistic, so, too, could the candidates' ideas about withdrawal.  

Both men, though acknowledging a worsening insurgency, expect to work with an Iraqi government that gains in legitimacy and strength and wants American troops to stick around until they're no longer needed.  

Both men forswear cutting and running. While Mr. Kerry says that if he were elected, he would begin withdrawing troops within the first six months of his administration, he's giving himself a whole term to get them all out. Mr. Bush says U.S. troops will stay as long as necessary and no longer, but the U.S. Army says it plans to maintain current levels at least through 2007.  

As the occupation has shown, though, facts on the ground don't have much respect for best-case scenarios. It is not at all out of the realm of possibility, for instance, that a government hostile to the United States could be elected, and demand the U.S. leave earlier than expected - risking civil war in Iraq.  

A USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll in April found that while the majority of Iraqis said they would feel less secure without the coalition, 57 percent said foreign troops should leave anyway. One can only imagine that this sentiment has hardened and spread in the intervening months, and that when election campaigning begins in Iraq, a good many candidates will stump on a send-the-Yankees-home platform.  

If they dominated the newly elected national assembly, they could ask the coalition forces to leave under the theory that those very forces perpetuate the insurgency. If the coalition leaves prematurely, though, Iraq risks breaking up.  

This chain of events does not have to be. Some Iraqi experts believe that U.S.-backed interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi will marshal a political coalition that wins in the expected January elections.  

Still, with the CIA giving three not-very-hopeful outlooks for Iraq (the worst being civil war, the best being tenuous stability), it would be unwise to count on the best outcome.  

The candidates may not want to talk about anything less than the best-case scenario out of concern for dampening troop morale or boosting the insurgents. But inside their respective headquarters, let's hope they're seriously considering them all.  

If every year we deploy 100K troops to Iraq it means 700 will be killed and 5,000 wounded, how long can we maintain this if within 5 years it will mean the destruction of 30,000 of people (3 divisions out of 10) who will no longer able or willing to serve in uniform again? In 10 years of Iraq occupation the all volunteer Army of 10 divisions will have lost 6 divisions of troops and be wittled down to just 4 divisions. Most combat studies say a unit is knocked out of combat after its suffered 10% losses. The U.S. Army is RIGHT NOW at this breaking point after 2 years in Iraq! Another two years of piss poor non-adaptation in Iraq and the Army will collapse. Faced with constant deployments until you are dead or wounded even the most weakest co-dependant who needs money and peer approval will grow some male genitals and stand up for himself when faced with imminent self-exctinction going along with a fatally flawed war effort.  

The answer is improve force QUALITY: the world is not a RMA "Radio Shack" we cannot squander the 28% better armor protection of tracked armored fighting vehicles: we are in the 4th Generation of Warfare not a "Third Wave" of feel-good computers 

Many well-intentioned pundits have cited the nation-state war phase of Iraq bringing too few troops (quantity) to restore social order for a nation of 25, 000, 000 the size of the southeastern U.S. What these folks are trying to do is connect with the American people to get them to demand changes from a Bush administration that refuses to admit to any mistakes, fire anyone who is incompetent or to adapt. As the flag-draped coffins continue to fly in to Dover AFB, the question is at what point out of necessity will the American people demand changes or Bush's impeachment?  

A close study of the Iraq casualties shows that the source of the Iraq debacle is the snobby psychology of American General Officers who refused to stay connected to reality in their rise to high rank amidst of selfish culture of narcissism and yes-man egomania. American Generals if they were egalitarian and wise could reverse the situation in Iraq even despite the war being unjust and wrong from the get go. Smart generaliship would pull our troops immediately out of Saddam palaces, reduce our presence to unseen but fortified bases and intervene only as needed. Smart generals would apologize to the Iraqis we have wronged and promise to leave their country by an exact date. If the Bush administration wants to occupy Iraq indefinitely, then moral generals would resign in protest against such stupidity and wastage of our men. However, the American people need to wake up and realize that the Generals we have are NOT Horatio Algers who have risen by hard work and technotactical brilliance, they not only do not care about our men and women to the required degree, but are back-stabbing, weak minded conformists who look down on others of less rank in a false, insulated make-believe world where they can order people around with impunity. They look forward to fat retirement checks from Uncle Sam and post retirement jobs from corrupt contractors like General Dynamics, maker of the Stryker rubber tired truck which squaunders away billions of dollars from life saving armor and armament our men need.

The spectre of corrupt generals is not new, Britiain had this problem when she was the world's reigning "super power" in the 19th century. Dr. Norman Dixon details exactly how weak people with hang ups about their masculinity are attracted to military service and how they can rise to places where they can do the most damage in his book, "The Psychology of Military Incompetence": 

www.reocities.com/militaryincompetence 

These GOs have no concept at all of ADULTS who after we have taken away their nation, destroyed their homes might actually not just disobey us, but actually take up arms and start blowing up our easy target supply convoys. As a matter of national survival, the American people should rid DoD and the top ranks of all our officers of those who cling to the Tofflerian world view that we are in a new age where mental gadgets replace the physical, and who are narcissistic snobs.  

If we fail to do this the very survival of our nation will be in jeopardy.    

Replacing the current crop of incompetent officers is only a short-term fix. America needs to face the harsh truths that we need to decide what we really believe in as a culture about military service and to create a non-narcissistic culture that wiull attract our best and brightest into its ranks or else we will continue to have our worst and most dimmest sending our children to their deaths in rubber-tired trucks as the enemy cackles as he pushes a button and blows them up.  

NLB from now on in both nation-state and sub-national conflicts/everyone must fight--no more snobbery/everyone be in TAFVs to include armored tracked resupply. 

Assuming we can get competent leadership in the U.S. military, the harsh reality must be faced that from now on all wars will likely be NON-LINEAR. We will never get 100 divisions certainly not through volunteers to have enough people to clear large areas of the earth for a support underclass to run around in vulnerable, rubber-tired trucks. We have  no choice....the non-linear battlefield requires EVERYBODY be armored and tracked...there is no escaping this reality...we need a quantity of quality... 

The only way to adequately protect troops against roadside bomb blasts is by using tracked armored fighting vehicles with MULTIPLE ARMOR LAYERS. Trucks cannot carry the HARD STEEL needed to stop bullets and the SOFT STEEL to stop bomb fragments....you need to start with a vehicle with a unified armored body with homogenuous steel that is both hard/soft then add outer layers spaced from the hull to slow down bomb fragments and pre-detonate RPGs.  

The truth is that the Army brass like Rummy's DoD are refusing to adapt to the PHYSICAL realities in Iraq which required tracked armored vehicles to protect our troops as much as we can as the Israelis do. Wheeled vehicles will always be 28% less weight/space efficient than tracks can be. The Army and DoD are narcissists who think we are in a "RMA" where mental electronic gadgets can replace the physical so we can skimp on armor protection, which has been proven a failure in Iraq, and Afghanistan. Details:

www.reocities.com/transformationunderfire 

The Army has THOUSANDS of M113 Gavin light tracks sitting unused in storage. that weigh the same as FMTV trucks but are FAR MORE ARMOR PROTECTED THAN "ARMORED" HMMWVS and Stryker TRUCKS . 

Light infantry narcissist Army brass & others bought off by GDLS don't want tracks and are squandering away BILLIONS on electronic BS and handfuls of expensive, sexy rubber-tired trucks while our troops are getting killed/maimed in Iraq/Afghanistan.  

We should demand Rumsfeld and Schoomaker be replaced by people who understand we need our troops in tracks not trucks in Iraq/Afghanistan.   

The Wheel Versus Track Dilemma 

www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/2wheels98.pdf  

by Paul Hornback 

With the development of any new Army combat vehicle, the question, “Which is better: a wheeled vehicle or a tracked vehicle?” surfaces again and again. In order to answer this question, the U.S. Army has tested and studied the merits and shortfalls of wheeled and tracked combat platforms for the past 30 years. Results indicate that no single criterion can be applied that will answer the wheeled-versus-track issue for all situations and missions. In fact, the underlying premise in resolving the wheeled-versus-track dilemma is deeply rooted in the complex variables regarding the platform’s combat mission, terrain profile, and specific vehicular characteristics. 

Tests and studies, however, established a set of criteria to determine a platform’s optimal configuration. Although most of this information is over ten years old, the basic factors which impact the physics of mobility have not changed and are still relevant. 

MOBILITY. Mobility, as defined by the 1988 Mobility Analysis for the TRADOC

Wheeled-Versus-Track Study, is the ability to move freely and rapidly over the terrain of interest to accomplish varied combat objectives.[1] Mobility is thus measured by a system’s freedom of movement (percent of the terrain over which the vehicle is mobile) and its average speed or travel time over that terrain. A platform’s gross vehicle weight and its footprint (the area of track or tire which impacts the ground) determine the resultant ground pressure that the platform imparts on the soil. The soil strength, coupled with the vehicle’s characteristic ground pressure, determine a parameter entitled Vehicle Cone Index (VCI), which is a key first-order discriminator of a platform’s mobility. The higher the VCI, or ground pressure, the less mobile the platform becomes. Figure 1 shows that, as ground pressure increases, so does the percentage of No-Go Terrain (terrain over which a combat platform is immobile) due to traction loss in wet, temperate areas. 

A vehicle’s mobility is impacted by its tractive ability over various soil types (dry, wet, sand, or snow-covered) and its ability to maneuver over obstacles, cross gaps, and negotiate varied vegetation. As a general rule of thumb, a lower VCI not only equates to better soft-soil mobility but also indicates better performance on slopes, in sandy terrain, over obstacles/gap crossings and when overriding vegetation.[2] From a mobility perspective, tracked vehicles offer the best solution for a versatile platform that is required to operate over diverse terrain, including extremely difficult ground, because tracks inherently provide a greater surface area than wheels, resulting in a lower VCI.[3] Recent operations in Bosnia have demonstrated the inherent weaknesses of wheeled vehicles with regard to mobility and protection.[4] When operations were conducted on roads, wheeled vehicles demonstrated excellent mobility and speed; but when off-road usage was required, and wet or snow conditions prevailed, mobility suffered.Wheeled vehicles inherently attain faster road speeds and, therefore, offer the best solution where unrestricted mobility is not the primary mission driver and on-road usage exceeds off-road usage.  So, vehicle weight and off-road usage constitute two key criteria for mobility.

Figure 2 compares the average 100 km mission travel time for both wheeled and tracked platforms as off-road usage increases      (recall that mobility was defined as both freedom of movement and travel time over the terrain). As off-road usage dominates the       vehicle’s profile, tracked configurations provide significantly better mission travel times. Consequently, Army studies indicate that      when a vehicle’s mission requires off-road usage greater than 60 percent and gross vehicle weight exceeds 10 tons, a                 tracked configuration is preferred for combat roles.[6] However, when the gross vehicle weight exceeds 20 tons and         off-road usage remains above 60 percent, a tracked configuration is required to guarantee the best mobility for                unrestricted, all-weather tactical operations.[7]  

SURVIVABILITY. A combat platform’s survivability is dependent on numerous

criteria, to include mine and ballistic protection, size/silhouette, and stealthiness. Tracked vehicles, by design, are inherently more compact than wheeled vehicles.[8] The primary reasons for a tracked vehicle’s compactness are reduced suspension clearance, wheel turning clearance, and the absence of multiple transfer cases and drive shafts that are integral to the design of multiwheeled vehicles. Army studies have indicated that, for a comparable VCI (or ground pressure) at the same gross vehicle weight, wheeled platforms require up to six times more volume for drive train and suspension components than tracked platforms. This results in up to a 28 percent increase in vehicle volume if the same interior volume is maintained.[9] 

Survivability analyses clearly indicate that a larger size is more readily seen and subsequently hit and destroyed. Additionally, as a combat platform’s size increases, so does the gross vehicle weight (provided the same ballistic and mine protection are maintained), which tends to degrade vehicle mobility and deployability. In general, wheeled platforms are more vulnerable to small arms fire and grenade, mine, and artillery fragments, due to the inherent weakness of wheeled suspension designs, components, and tires.[10] Wheeled vehicles may now be able to continue movement for limited distances at reduced speeds when tires are punctured by small arms rounds, battlefield debris, or shrapnel, due to the advent of run-flat tires. Run-flat tires typically contain a hard rubber insert (some with nitrogen filled cells) inside the tire. The insert bears no vehicle load until the tire is punctured, at which point the load is transferred to the insert and vehicle movement may continue for a limited distance and speed. On the plus side, wheeled platforms provide a reduced noise signature while moving, primarily due to less vibration and metal to metal contact on running gear. Improvements in track technology (i.e., Roller Chain Band Track) and decoupled running gear have decreased noise signatures for tracked vehicles, but not to the level attained by wheeled platforms. [Editor: not true, band tracked AFVs are quieter than wheeled armored cars/trucks]

Tracked platforms do provide a skidsteer capability which allows the vehicle to pivot steer (or neutral steer) and virtually pivot in place. This unique maneuver capability enhances survivability by permitting a 180-degree directional change when confined or built-up areas are encountered, and while traveling on narrow road surfaces. From a survivability perspective, tracked vehicles offer smaller silhouettes, reduced volume, enhanced maneuverability, and better ballistic protection, providing a balance that equates to a more survivable platform. 

SUPPORTABILITY. A combat platform’s supportability is dependent on numerous factors, to include fuel usage, reliability, and O&S costs. Wheeled vehicles traditionally offer better fuel economy due to the reduced friction losses inherent in wheel/tire suspensions and running gear. The better fuel economy translates into smaller on-board fuel storage requirements or greater operating ranges for wheeled platforms. 

Previous articles and studies have concluded that wheeled vehicles are intrinsically more reliable than tracked vehicles and, therefore, require less maintenance and supply support (spare parts). However, one must bear in mind that wheeled vehicles generally have a higher percentage of on-road usage while tracked vehicles incur more off-road usage. Obviously, the more severe cross-country terrain results in reduced reliability for the tracked vehicle. A recent test of the Up-Armored HMMWV, running a scout profile with 68 percent offroad travel, resulted in significantly lower reliability when compared to the same platform running at a tactical truck profile of only 40 percent off-road. Given that wheeled platforms offer better fuel economy and reliability (to an extent), then Operating and Support (O&S) costs are lower than those demonstrated by tracked platforms. This makes wheeled platforms excellent candidates for support roles where overall mileage is high and primarily conducted onroad. 

[1st TSG (A) Editor: there are no "safe" "rear" areas for "support" role units to operate wheeled trucks on easily ambushed roads. Slapping thousands of pounds of make-shift armor onto trucks degrades their suspensions, drivetrains and engines eliminating any cost savings. Hornback would be saying these things if it was politically correct in today's wheeled Army.]  

CONCLUSION. Figure 3 presents an overview of the key advantages demonstrated by wheeled and tracked platforms based on thirty years of Army tests and studies. Wheeled and tracked vehicles each exhibit advantages that can be optimized for the 21st century battlefield, provided the platform’s combat mission, terrain profile and specific characteristics are carefully assessed. For combat vehicles, vice combat support or combat service support vehicles, Army studies unanimously conclude that a tracked configuration is the optimal solution for tactical, high-mobility roles (off-road usage greater than 60 percent), gross vehicle weights in excess of 20 tons, and missions requiring unrestricted terrain movement, continuous all-weather operations, smaller silhouettes/dimensional envelopes, and greater survivability. 

Notes 

1. “Mobility Analysis for the TRADOC Wheeled Versus Track Vehicle Study, Final Report,” Robert F. Unger, Geotechnical Laboratory, Department of the Army, Waterways Experiment Station, Corps of Engineers, Vicksburg, Miss.,September 1988, 1.

2. Ibid, 26.

3. “Wheels or Tracks,” Military Technology, Vol XVIII, Issue 7, Jul 1994, 14.

4. “Is There Any Future for the APC,” Military Technology, Vol. XXI, Issue 3, March 1997, 103.

5. “Mobility Analysis,” 48.

6. “Wheeled Versus Track Vehicle Study, Final Report,” Studies and Analysis Activity, Headquarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,

Fort Monroe, Va., March 1985, 1-99.

7. Ibid, 1-92.

8. Ibid, 1-62.

9. Ibid, 1-62.

10. “Wheels or Tracks

11. Mr.Paul Hornback is a general engineer with the federal government. He is presently assigned to the HQ TRADOC  Combat  Development Engineering Division, Fort Knox Field Office, which provides reliability, maintainability, and systems engineering  support to the Directorate of Force Development, Fort Knox, Ky. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering and a  Master of Science in Industrial Engineering, both from the University of Louisville. His military experience stems from a six-year  tour as a UH-1N helicopter pilot in the U.S. Marine Corps. 

Page 34 U.S. Army ARMOR magazine— March-April 1998 

We cannot armor up the entire force with $3-10 million dollar each platforms....we lack the industrial capacity to even slap one armor layer of steel to our trucks in Iraq.  

The Army will have to come to its senses or DIE.

The battlefield of the cold war with bullets and HE is the same battlefield of today except today its WORSE there are no safe rear areas for rubber tired trucks even if armored.Everyone must fight and everyone must work. We must dramatically improve our QUALITY by having a smart, thinking, professional adult force in agile tracked armored fighting vehicles capable of both 2D and 3D maneuver, that can adapt and wage both nation-state and sub-nation-state wars. Such an agile force can fight in all directions just like the non-linear enemy can, we suggest we use James Gavin's Paratrooper model of the initiative taking, self-reliant Soldier but supplied with adequate ground and air vehicular means to dominate the struggle hands-down from the get go. There will ne no underclass in such a non-linear "Air-Mech" Army and resupply will be done by tracked armored carriers using the palletized loading system along unpredictable routes not just paved roads. 

Stryker/FCS cannot be had for everyone, the $50K Humvee truck reality U.S. Army/marine corps

The next reality we must face is COST.

Even if the wheeled Stryker and Future Combat System trucks were good (which they are not they are based on the folly of staying out of enemy contact and dancing around him with computer information sharing) at $3.3 million and a projected $10 million each they simply cannot be obtained for everyone in the Army to enable it to fight on the non-linear battlefield. There will be "haves and have nots". The enemy will simply attack the "have nots". This is BS. This is not acceptible. A perfect example of this is the current Stryker brigades where over half the unit drives around in unarmored support trucks! The recent mess tent massacre in Mosul shows that the whole concept of infantry running around in rubber tired trucks according to computer gymnastics AVOIDING combat backed by an underclass of support non-combatants in tents is fatally vulnerable on the non-linear battlefield where the enemy has to be faced even when it is not at a time/place of our own choosing.

We must face the truth that if we continue to lust for overly expensive vehicles that please GOs and give them retirement jobs with GDLS the troops are going to pay for it WITH THEIR LIVES AND THEIR LIMBS. This is morally unacceptible. Its high time we face the demands of the NLB and realize that unless we are going to make some kind of "stealth" tank that is invisible to the low technology og human aided optical weaponry, we had better mass produce an affordable, simple light tracked AFV that can have modular multiple armor layers added and a 1-man 25-30mm autocannon turret that can penetrate building walls to prevail in the cat vs. mouse NLB for everyone ASAP. An autocannon like what the Bradley has shown to dominate the fight in Iraq but without the weight/expense of a 2-man turret which smothers infantry in the back. The benefits of exotic materials are only an increase in kinetic energy protection by a factor of 1x...to defeat shaped charges on RPGs and guided missiles you are going to need a sacrificial armor layer attached at a space from the hull anyway--so the point is moot. There is no reason to build a "plastic" tank if its going to cost us 10x a metal one and will still need outer armor that if applied to the metal tank achieves the same protection at 1/10th the cost. We need to stop playing and pretending we want to fight wars and decide to actually fight them by supplying to EVERY Soldier in our Army a baseline tracked AFV that is under 11 tons for C-130 air transport, amphibious, highly cross-country mobile, easy to maintain and operate to effect 2D and 3D maneuvers over the open and closed terrains of planet Earth...and with lots of power to accept an endless array of new armors and weaponry to prevail in human conflicts...THAT VEHICLE IS THE M113 GAVIN!

The young officer's Najaf battle AAR concludes in his "Lessons Learned" section: 

  1. The most effective use of the mechanized infantry was in conjunction with elements of light infantry. The light infantry was greatly aided by the firepower of the Bradleys, while the vehicles could transport successive groups of Soldiers. This proved very successful in practice during the battle of Najaf. The Bradleys supplied preparatory fires on the objective, deployed an initial entry force of soldiers, and when that force was established returned to the attack position and transported additional infantry to the objective to consolidate. The standard mechanized configuration provides too few Soldiers per vehicle, and standard light infantry lacks responsive heavy fires and armored transportation. These problems were eliminated in Najaf by attaching our light platoon (sans vehicles) to a mechanized company.

Why wait until we are in a war to attach light infant ad hoc to Bradleys when such thrown together arrangements in the case of the USMC result in a lack of previously perfected integrated vehicle/men tactics such as using smokescreens? Every Army light infantry battalion has a "Delta" Weapons company with Humvee "gun trucks" that are even less armored than the "up-armored" ones that were left behind at the Najaf battle. Delta companies are to offer fire support for Alpha, Bravo and Charlie rifle companies whose men fight on foot...how can they do this when they are too vulnerable to be involved in a close fight? Every single M113 Gavin the Army now has in storage needs to be placed immediately into service to reverse the Iraq debacle, and to rectify the HMMWV truck vulnerability of the light unit's Delta Weapons companies as well as providing A, B and C companies armored mobility in the near term. We can supply these M113 Gavin tracks from storage and upgrade them to re-equip all Delta companies in the Army within a few weeks. 

Other M113 Gavins should be modified into XM1108 configuration to carry PLS flat racks to load/offload vital supplies and protect them. Some should be fitted with waterjets to be "AmphiGavins" to expedite the offload of our sealift ships and reduce dependance upon friendly ports. The M113 Gavin forms the backbone of 50% of the Army's heavy divisions now which whether we realize it or not are our 2D maneuver forces--what we need to do is fully maximize its protective and armament potential and mechanize the light units of the Army which do our 3D maneuver---with an option residing in their D companies and armorize their resupply means.   

The production line of the M113 Gavin should be re-opened to produce the definitive "M113A4" variant which would be v-hull shaped on the bottom and incorporate the latest technologies to defeat road side bombs determined from actual testing of modified M113 hulls and new shapes and various add-on armors. That for the $BILLIONS we have spent on the from-scratch FCS that its designs do not even address the threat from below--the #1 killer of our troops in combat since Vietnam is grounds that this program be stopped at once. Since FCS is unaffordable to equip the ENTIRE U.S. Army which is what we need to prevail on the NLB, and from the beginning its design ignores the threat from below, we must put all our energies and know-how into the affordable tracked AFV that we CAN supply in quantity to really transform our Army for victory. The A4 Gavin may use hybrid-electric drive for 600 mile range, stealth and extra electric power, infared camouflage outer coverings, band tracks and other options to provide the same high road speeds and reduced vibration features that the deluded wheeled truck advocates try to use to justify wheeled platforms that are unsound in mobility, protection, armament and safety. The quietness of HE drive, band-tracked configuration A4 Gavins would ease the possible hurt feelings of local civilians having "tanks" operate in their neighborhood but without giving our troops a "glass jaw" when winning "hearts & minds" by establishing security and good power, water and sewage infrastructure.  

The entire world now knows how best to fight the U.S. military--attack its weak underclass of support trucks. The enemy in Iraq learned about the roadside bomb from the Israeli experience in Southern Lebanon. The Israeli Defense force (IDF) quickly learned to get away from roads and to up-armor and use tracked "tanks" such that they were able to stay for years in South Lebanon without anywhere near the casualties wea re suffering now in iraq. Officers in the IDF cannot believe how incompetent we are showing ourselves to be to the rest of the world in Iraq. While the current crop of gOs lust for Iraq to end and to only slap armor onto the trucks in Iraq now to preserve the snobby status quo and their RMA cash cows, the sad truth is the next capable enemy is going to adapt the ambush techniques that work in Iraq to his fight--lots of high explosives exoploding thin skinned, rubber tired trucks. The enemy is going to keep doing it to our men and women until such time that that tactic ceases to work when we have overcome it with a counter. That counter is to ARMOR UP THE ENTIRE ARMY INTO TRACKED ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES WITH MULTIPLE ARMOR LAYERS WHO CAN GO CROSS COUNTRY TO AVOID ROAD AMBUSHES, THAT CAN FLY BY HELICOPTERS AND C-130s OVER POTENTIAL AMBUSHES. An Army that if caught in ambush shrugs the blast off and attacks and hunts down and kills the trigger men. An Army that can fan out and keep moving as it secures its own supply lines and not become mortar and rocket aim points living in elaborate base camps and former dictator palaces.   

DEATH NARRATIVES 

March 2003

Staff Sgt. Chris Muir
32
Army School of Ammunition, Royal Logistic Corps
Romsey, England
Killed during an explosive ordnance disposal operation in southern Iraq on March 31, 2003

RM-20

Spc. Brandon J. Rowe
20
502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
Roscoe, Illinois
Killed in action by Iraqi artillery in Ayyub, Iraq, on March 31, 2003

Maj. Stephen Ballard
N/A
3 Commando Brigade, Royal .marines
Hometown of record not available
Died of natural causes on March 30, 2003

Lance Cpl. Shaun Andrew Brierley
28
212 Signal Squadron, 1 Armoured Division HQ & Signal Regiment
West Yorkshire, England
Killed in a traffic accident in Kuwait on March 30, 2003

Christopher R. Maddison
24
539 Assault Squadron, Royal .marines
North Yorkshire, England
Killed during fighting in the area of Basra on March 30, 2003

A-23

Capt. Aaron J. Contreras
31
Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169, .marine Aircraft Group 39
Sherwood, Oregon
Killed when his UH-1N Huey helicopter crashed in southern Iraq on March 30, 2003

A-23

Sgt. Michael V. Lalush
23
.marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron169, .marine Aircraft Group 39
Troutville, Virginia
Killed in a UH-1N Huey helicopter crash in southern Iraq on March 30, 2003

A-23

Sgt. Brian D. McGinnis
23
Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169, .marine Aircraft Group 39
St. George, Delaware
Killed in a UH-1N Huey helicopter crash in southern Iraq on March 30, 2003

S-3

Staff Sgt. James W. Cawley
41
F Company, 2nd Battalion, 23rd .marine Regiment, 4th .marine Division
Roy, Utah
Killed in a firefight with Iraqi forces on March 29, 2003

B-5st

Pfc. Michael Russell Creighton Weldon
20
2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, U.S. Army
Conyers, Georgia
Killed in car bomb attack in Iraq on March 29, 2003

B-5st

Cpl. Michael Edward Curtin
23
2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division
Howell, New Jersey
Killed in car bomb attack in Iraq on March 29, 2003

B-5st

Pfc. Diego Fernando Rincon
19
2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division
Conyers, Georgia
Killed in car bomb attack in Iraq on March 29, 2003

B-5st

Sgt. Eugene Williams
24
2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division
Highland, New York
Killed in car bomb attack in Iraq on March 29, 2003

ACC-11

Lance Cpl. William W. White
24
3rd Amphibious Assault Battalion, 1st .marine Division
Brooklyn, New York
Killed in a vehicle accident in Iraq on March 29, 2003

Lance Cpl. Matty Hull
25
The Blues & Royals, Household Cavalry Regiment
Windsor, England
Killed in action in southern Iraq on March 28, 2003

S-1

Sgt. Fernando Padilla- Ramirez
26
Wing Support Squadron 371, .marine Wing Support Group 37
Yuma, Arizona
Killed in action after conducting convoy operations in the vicinity of Nasiriya on March 28, 2003

ACC-10

Sgt. Roderic A. Solomon
32
2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division
Fayetteville, North Carolina
Killed when a Bradley Fighting Vehicle rolled off a cliff on March 28, 2003, in a non-hostile accident

?Cpl. Robert M. Rodriguez
21
1st Tank Battalion, 1st .marine division
Queens, New York
Killed in action March 27, 2003, along the Euphrates River near Nasiriya 

?Gunnery Sgt. Joseph Menusa
33
1st Combat Engineer Battalion, 1st .marine division
San Jose, California
Killed in action on March 27, 2003

*B-5

Lance Cpl. Jesus A. Suarez Del Solar
20
1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st .marine division
Escondido, California
Killed when he stepped on an unexploded U.S. cluster bomblet in southern Iraq on March 27, 2003

* Listed as a vehicular problem because LAV are rubber tired trucks that need pampering by men inside walking ahead to find trouble before it runs into it.

 

ACC-16

Spc. William A. Jeffries
39
152nd Infantry Regiment, Illinois Army National Guard
Evansville, Indiana
Died from a sudden illness on March 26, 2003, in Rota, Spain, after he was evacuated from Kuwait

ACC-12

Maj. Kevin G. Nave
36
3rd Battalion, 5th .marine Regiment, 1st .marine division
Union Lake, Michigan
Killed in a vehicle accident in Iraq on March 26, 2003

Cpl. Stephen John Allbutt
35
Queen's Royal Lancers
Stoke-on-Trent, England
Killed when his tank was struck by a shell from another British tank on March 25, 2003

Trooper David Jeffrey Clarke
19
Queen's Royal Lancers
Littleworth, England
Killed when his tank was struck by a shell from another British tank on March 25, 2003

?Hospital Corpsman 3rd Class Michael Vann Johnson Jr.
25
Naval Medical Center San Diego, 3rd .marine Division Detachment
Little Rock, Arkansas
Killed in action in Iraq on March 25, 2003

?Pfc. Francisco A. Martinez Flores
21
1st Tank Battalion, 1st .marine Division
Los Angeles, California
Killed while his unit was conducting convoy operations in the vicinity of the Euphrates River on March 25, 2003

?Staff Sgt. Donald C. May Jr.
31
1st Tank Battalion, 1st .marine Division
Richmond, Virginia
Killed while his unit was conducting convoy operations in the vicinity of the Euphrates River on March 25, 2003

?Lance Cpl. Patrick T. O'Day
20
1st Tank Battalion, 1st .marine Division
Santa Rosa, California
Killed while his unit was conducting convoy operations in the vicinity of the Euphrates River on March 25, 2003

G-18

Maj. Gregory Stone
40
124th Air Support Operations Squadron, Idaho Air National Guard,
Boise, Idaho
Died on March 25, 2003, of wounds received when a grenade was thrown into a tent by a fellow U.S. soldier at Camp Pennsylvania, Kuwait, on March 22, 2003


ACC-15

Cpl. Evan T. James
21
6th Engineer Support Battalion, 4th Force Service Support Group
LaHarpe, Illinois
Drowned while crossing the Saddam Canal on March 24, 2003

ACC-15

Sgt. Bradley S. Korthaus
28
6th Engineer Support Battalion, 4th Force Service Support Group
Davenport, Iowa
Drowned while crossing the Saddam Canal on March 24, 2003

Sgt. Steven Mark Roberts
33
2nd Royal Tank Regiment, British Army
Bradford, West Yorkshire
Killed in action near Al Zubayr southwest of Basra on March 24, 2003

?Spc. Gregory P. Sanders
19
3rd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division
Hobart, Indiana
Killed in action in Iraq on March 24, 2003

Lance Cpl. Barry 'Baz' Stephen
31
1st Battalion, Black Watch Regiment
Perth, Scotland
Killed in action near Al Zubayr, Iraq, on March 24, 2003

Sapper Luke Allsopp
24
33 Engineer Regiment (Explosive Ordnance Disposal)
North London, England
Killed in an attack on British vehicles in southern Iraq on March 23, 2003

USMC Debacle at Nasiriyah

Best documentation is the Discovery Channel's program on the fight for Baghdad; under-armored, huge target AAV7s packed with marines inside without gunshields to protect them to fire at RPG gunners, without forward cavalry get stuck in mud, without using smokescreeens get blasted by RPGs...we suspect most of USMC dead are from RPGs

?Sgt. Michael E. Bitz
31
2nd Assault Amphibious Battalion, 2nd .marine Division
Ventura, California
Killed in action near Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

?Lance Cpl. Thomas A. Blair
24
2nd Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion, Air Control Group 28, 2nd .marine Aircraft Wing
Wagoner, Oklahoma
Initially listed as missing in action after operations near Nasiriya on March 24, 2003; his remains were recovered on March 28, 2003

?Lance Cpl. Brian Rory Buesing
20
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Cedar Key, Florida
Killed in action near Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

?Pfc. Tamario D. Burkett
21
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Buffalo, New York
Killed in operations on the outskirts of Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

?Cpl. Kemaphoom A. Chanawong- se
22
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Waterford, Connecticut
Killed in action during operations on the outskirts of Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

?Lance Cpl. Donald J. Cline Jr.
21
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Washoe, Nevada
Killed in operations on the outskirts of Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

Staff Sgt. Simon Cullingworth
36
33 Engineer Regiment (Explosive Ordnance Disposal)
Essex, England
Killed in attack on British vehicles in southern Iraq on March 23, 2003

?Lance Cpl. David K. Fribley
26
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Lee, Florida
Killed in action near Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

?Cpl. Jose A. Garibay
21
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Orange, California
Killed in action near Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

?Pvt. Jonathan L. Gifford
30
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Decatur, Illinois
Killed in operations on the outskirts of Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

?Cpl. Jorge A. Gonzalez
20
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Los Angeles, California
Killed in action near Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

ACC-12

Sgt. Nicholas M. Hodson
22
3rd Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Smithville, Missouri
Killed in a vehicle accident on March 23, 2003

?Pvt. Nolen R. Hutchings
19
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Boiling Springs, South Carolina
Killed in operations on the outskirts of Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

?Staff Sgt. Phillip A. Jordan
42
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Enfield, Connecticut
Killed in action near Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

Flight Lt. Kevin Barry Main
37
9 Squadron, Royal Air Force
Burntwood, Staffordshire, England
Killed when his aircraft was downed by a U.S. Patriot missile near the Kuwaiti border on March 23, 2003.

?Lance Cpl. Patrick R. Nixon
21
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
St. Louis, Missouri
Killed in action on March 23, 2003, on the outskirts of Nasiriya

507th Maintenance Company Debacle

DETAILS: www.washtimes.com/national/20030709-121049-4754r.htm

G-16

1st Sgt. Robert J. Dowdy
38
507th Maintenance Company, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade
Cleveland, Ohio
Killed after his convoy was ambushed in Iraq on March 23, 2003

G-16

Pfc. Lori Piestewa
22
507th Maintenance Company, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade
Tuba City, Arizona
Killed when her convoy was ambushed on March 23, 2003, near Nasiriya

S-1

Spc. James M. Kiehl
22
507th Maintenance Company, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade
Des Moines, Iowa
Killed when his convoy was ambushed near Nasiriya on March 23, 2003.

S-1

Chief Warrant Officer Johnny Villareal Mata
35
507th Maintenance Company, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade
El Paso, Texas
Killed when his convoy was ambushed in Nasiriya, Iraq, on March 23, 2003

S-1

Sgt. Donald Walters
33
507th Maintenance Company
Kansas City, Missouri
Walters was killed along with eight other soldiers after their supply convoy was ambushed at Nasiriya, Iraq, on March 23, 2003. On April 12, 2004, he was posthumously awarded the Silver Star for his actions. In May 2004, the U.S. military changed his official status from Killed in Action to Prisoner of War-Murdered after an investigation found that he was captured and later killed by his unknown captors.

S-1

Pfc. Howard Johnson II
21
507th Maintenance Company, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade
Mobile, Alabama
Killed in an Iraqi ambush at Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

S-1

Pvt. Ruben Estrella-Soto
18
507th Maintenance Company, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade
El Paso, Texas
Killed after his convoy was ambushed in Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

S-1

Spc. Jamaal R. Addison
22
507th Maintenance Company
Roswell, Georgia
Killed in an Iraqi ambush at Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

S-1

Sgt. George Edward Buggs
31
3rd Forward Support Battalion, 3rd Infantry Division
Barnwell, South Carolina
Killed after his convoy was ambushed in Iraq on March 23, 2003

S-1

Army Spc. Edward J. Anguiano
24
3rd Combat Support Battalion
Brownsville, Texas
Went missing on March 23, 2003, when his convoy was ambushed; his remains were recovered on April 24

S-1

Pfc. Brandon Sloan
19
507th Maintenance Company
Bedford, Ohio
Killed when his convoy was ambushed at Nasiriya, Iraq, on March 23, 2003

?2nd Lt. Frederick E. Pokorney Jr.
31
Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion, 10th .marine Regiment
Nye, Nevada
Killed in action near Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

?Sgt. Brendon C. Reiss
23
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Natrona, Wyoming
Killed in action after his unit was engaged in combat operations March 23, 2003, near Nasiriya

?Cpl. Randal Kent Rosacker
21
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
San Diego, California
Killed in action near Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

G-19st

Capt. Christopher Scott Seifert
27
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
Easton, Pennsylvania
Killed by a grenade thrown into a tent by a fellow U.S. soldier at Camp Pennsylvania, Kuwait, on March 22, 2003

?Lance Cpl. Thomas J. Slocum
22
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Adams, Colorado
Killed in action near Nasiriya on March 23, 2003

Flight Lt. David Rhys Williams
37
9 Squadron, Royal Air Force
Crickhowell, Powys, England
Killed when his aircraft was downed by a U.S. Patriot missile near the Kuwaiti border on March 23, 2003.

?Lance Cpl. Michael J. Williams
31
1st Battalion, 2nd .marine Regiment
Yuma, Arizona
Initially listed as missing in action after operations near Nasiriya on March 23, 2003; his remains were recovered on March 28, 2003

ACC

Lt. Thomas Mullen Adams
27
U.S. Navy exchange officer assigned to the British Royal Navy's 849 Squadron
La Mesa, California
Killed when two British Sea King helicopters collided over the Persian Gulf on March 22, 2003

Lt. Philip D. Green
31
849 Squadron, Royal Navy
Freiston, Lincolnshire, England
Killed when two British Sea King helicopters collided over the Persian Gulf on March 22, 2003

Lt. Antony King
35
849 Squadron, A Flight, Royal Navy
Helston, England
Killed when two British Sea King helicopters collided over the Persian Gulf on March 22, 2003

Lt. Marc A. Lawrence
26
849 Squadron, Royal Navy
Westgate-on- Sea, Kent
Killed when two British Sea King helicopters collided over the Persian Gulf on March 22, 2003

S-4

Lance Cpl. Eric J. Orlowski
26
2nd Tank Battalion, 2nd .marine Division
Buffalo, New York
Killed by an accidental discharge of a .50 caliber machine gun on March 22, 2003, in Iraq

ACC-123

Spc. Brandon S. Tobler
19
671st Engineer Brigade, U.S. Army Reserve
Portland, Oregon
Died in a vehicle accident in Iraq on March 22, 2003

Lt. Philip West
32
849 Squadron A Flight, Royal Navy
Budock Water, England
Killed when two British Sea King helicopters collided over the Persian Gulf on March 22, 2003

Lt. James Williams
28
849 Squadron A Flight, Royal Navy
Falmouth, England
Killed when two British Sea King helicopters collided over the Persian Gulf on March 22, 2003

Lt. Andrew S. Wilson
36
849 Squadron, Royal Navy
Cornwall, England
Killed when two British Sea King helicopters collided over the Persian Gulf on March 22, 2003

ACC-27

Maj. Jay Aubin
36
3rd .marine Aircraft Wing
Waterville, Maine
Killed in a U.S. CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter crash on March 21, 2003

ACC-27

Capt. Ryan Beaupre
30
3rd .marine Aircraft Wing
Bloomington, Illinois
Killed in a U.S. CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter crash on March 21, 2003

Colour Sgt. John Cecil
36
Royal .marines 
Plymouth, England 

Killed in a U.S. CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter crash south of the Kuwait border on March 21, 2003

CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE OF AMERICAN IRAQ WAR DEAD 2003-2004

 

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